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Current History

THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

France and the Fifth Republic

THE FRENCH RIGHTIST REVOLUTION	<i>Hans Kohn</i>	257
THE LEGACY OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC	<i>Donald C. McKay</i>	262
THE FAILURE OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC	<i>Edward W. Fox</i>	267
AN ANXIOUS PRIDE: FRENCH POLICY, 1959	<i>Eugen Weber</i>	272
DE GAULLE'S FRENCH COMMUNITY	<i>Benjamin Rivlin</i>	278
AUSTERITY AND FIFTH REPUBLIC FINANCE	<i>Alzada Comstock</i>	284
LABOR AND MANAGEMENT UNDER DE GAULLE	<i>Val R. Lorwin</i>	289

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Cyprus Settlement	294
RECEIVED AT OUR DESK	303
THE MONTH IN REVIEW	308

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June, 1959

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Current History

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MAY, 1959

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"French experience of the last 150 years has been one of many shifts and turns. France has found herself repeatedly at the crossroads between a liberal democracy and an authoritarian militarist nationalism." In these words the introductory article of this issue underlines one of the most serious problems of the Fifth French Republic: the "Rightist Revolution." Subsequent articles discuss the background of the previous Republics of France and the enormous problems that face the French Government today: financial, industrial, colonial and foreign. Will General de Gaulle be able to overcome these difficulties? Somewhat pessimistically, Hans Kohn points out that the French concept of gloire "does not conform to the rapidly changing world of the mid-twentieth century," and that "In the midst of all the many political changes of the last two centuries the French system of government has shown little aptitude for adjustment."

The French Rightist Revolution

By HANS KOHN

Professor of History, City College of New York

THE revolution of May 13, 1958, which started with the cooperation of the French army among the French settlers in Algeria, has been approved by the French general elections held on November 30, 1958. The new French chamber has been compared by Raymond Aron, the Walter Lippmann of French journalism, with the "*chambre introuvable*" elected in 1815. The Chamber of 1815 was an ultra-royalist chamber, going far beyond the expectations and wishes of the then King Louis XVIII. The new deputies elected in the name of royalism tried to reduce the more moderate king to a subordinate position. Soon Louis XVIII was to doubt his luck in facing an overwhelmingly royalist chamber elected on the strength of a new electoral law and of a sudden switch of the French electorate to an extreme Rightist nationalist temper. Today's situation is perhaps similar.

As the royalist elections of 1815 were only outwardly a triumph for the king, so the de

Gaullist elections of November, 1958, were only outwardly a triumph for de Gaulle. In reality, they were an acceptance of the May 13 revolution by the majority of the French people. They were more than a personal vote of confidence for the lonely and enigmatic figure of General Charles de Gaulle. They went beyond de Gaulle. Even today the support for de Gaulle in France may well be larger than the support for the new chamber. This support for de Gaulle is not a new phenomenon in French history. A similar overwhelming support was given in December, 1848, to Prince Louis Napoleon and in June, 1940, to Marshal Henri Pétain. The three men—Louis Napoleon, Pétain and de Gaulle—are very different in their personality and of the three de Gaulle is by far the most impressive. Nevertheless, all three appealed to the military tradition in France, and the vote for them was an expression of the shift to a Rightist and nationalist position. All three were a vote against democracy. All

three were an appeal to French traditions of grandeur, though each one interpreted the French past somewhat differently.

Democracy and the Fourth Republic

World public opinion has not been entirely just toward the Fourth French Republic. It emerged from the military and moral collapse of France in World War II. It was based on the unfortunate fiction that France had been one of the victor nations of World War II and a great military power. Burdened with the double legacy of collapse and victory—a legacy never digested intellectually or morally—the Fourth Republic was born under unfortunate circumstances.

Nevertheless, it achieved much. It brought to the French people, and above all to the French workers, an unprecedented degree of individual prosperity. It started to modernize the French economic structure. France enregistered for the first time an increase in its birth rate. In its foreign policy the Fourth Republic accepted, and even started, the first steps toward European and North Atlantic integration. Hesitantly it even started a liberal and enlightened policy in its African colonies south of the Sahara. It had the courage to recognize the independence of its former protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia. All this is in no way a mean record for a democratic regime built upon such psychologically unstable foundations as the Fourth Republic.

In the elections of January, 1956, a majority of the French voters voted for a coalition of Socialists and Radicals led by Guy Mollet and Pierre Mendès-France. Before the elections Guy Mollet declared the Algerian war an absurdity and demanded negotiations and a reconciliation with the Algerians fighting for their independence. When he went to Algeria on February 6, 1956, immediately after the elections, to realize his program, he was frightened by the opposition of the French army and the French settlers. He accepted their policy and after his return to Paris tried to carry it through. He and his friend Robert Lacoste, both members of the Socialist party, covered up the campaign of ruthless terrorism pursued by the French army in its effort to stamp out the Algerian demand for independence, probably the blackest spot in the otherwise rapidly bright-

ening contemporary record of European colonialism in Asia and Africa. The French army and the French settlers in Algeria succeeded on April 6, 1956, in imposing their policy on the French Republic. From this cancer the Fourth Republic perished. With the revolution of May 13, 1958, the army and the settlers consummated their success of February, 1956.

Democracy and the Fifth Republic

In the elections of November, 1958, the anti-democratic forces in France achieved an overwhelming victory. This was partly due to the new electoral law. The new chamber offers an aspect rarely seen in French parliamentary history. It is a chamber without an opposition. The democratic parties are represented by about 50 deputies, the Communists by 10 deputies. Yet democrats and Communists received about 40 per cent of the popular vote. As against them there is arraigned a massive majority of 188 deputies of the *Union pour la Nouvelle République*, 132 Independents and 71 deputies from Algeria elected under the patronage of the French army and representing none but the extreme wing of the French settlers in Algeria. Even Guy Mollet who was one of the staunchest supporters of General de Gaulle last fall has been forced into opposition to the Fifth Republic as it emerged from the elections.

But the victory of the extreme nationalist groups in the recent elections was not only the result of the new electoral law. It reflected also the mood of a large number of the French people, a mood made up, as in December, 1848, and in June, 1940, of indifference to politics in general and disgust with democracy. Equally important was the wave of xenophobic nationalism which swept large parts of the French electorate. Whenever the voters had a choice between a moderate de Gaullist and an extreme nationalist, they voted for the candidate who was for the most ruthless prosecution of the war against Algerian self-determination and who stressed French military greatness and great power position, as expressed in the maintenance of the French colonial empire.

The difference between original de Gaulism and the Fifth Republic as it emerged can be best seen by a comparison of the atti-

tude of André Malraux, who was de Gaulle's first minister of information, and the present official Algerian policy. In a famous pre-referendum press conference Malraux promised the release of Rahmani, a Muslim Algerian officer of the French army who had been imprisoned. In a letter to the President of the Republic Rahmani had described the anguish the Algerian war was causing him and had asked for the end of torture of Algerian suspects, and the dispatch of three leading French writers to Algeria to investigate the tortures. Rahmani is still in prison; the writers never left for Algeria; and on February 17, 1959, a non-political group of highly respected French jurists under the presidency of René-William Thorp, formerly head of the Paris bar, denounced

the persistent recourse in Algeria to certain inhumane methods of extra-penal repression, under the form of tortures, their progressive extension in Metropolitan France, and the existence of unexplained disappearances in detention centers.

Liberal publications like the weekly *Express*, which follows the political line of Mendès-France, continue to be seized by the government. No solution is in sight for Algeria; instead the Algerian cancer is still growing and eating the substance of French democracy. As Guy Mollet did, de Gaulle shuns political solutions, promises economic improvement without being able to start it, and allows the army to continue its war of repression. Malraux has stepped into the background.

Jacques Soustelle and the French settlers in Algeria have emerged as the real victors. The Algerian problem is farther from solution than it was before the establishment of the Fifth Republic. The new French Premier, Michel Debré, appointed by President de Gaulle, repeated on February 9, 1959, in Algiers his unshakable determination to maintain French sovereignty and authority in Algeria. "*Algérie Française*," the battle cry of the French extremists of May 13, 1958, seemed confirmed as French official policy.

De Gaulle's Position

What is de Gaulle's personal position in this rapid evolution of an extremist French

nationalism? Nobody knows. Last October he had the opportunity to take the courageous step of negotiations with the Algerian nationalists. Instead, he demanded their surrender. He was responsible for holding "elections" in Algeria, for having exclusively "integrationists" elected and thus confining the official demand of the May 13, 1958, revolution for the "integration" of Algeria into France. President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, a devoted friend of France, of de Gaulle and of the West, asked to be allowed to meet de Gaulle and to offer his mediation in the Algerian war. President de Gaulle did not answer him. On February 17, President Bourguiba drew attention to a recent "grave deterioration" in French-Tunisian relations. Yet with all that, many friends of France abroad and many liberals in France still look to President de Gaulle as a possible brake on the rapid shift of France to a Rightist nationalism. Their hope may be justified. But General de Gaulle is, of course, subject to all the accidents of human nature; he may also follow the example of withdrawal which he has set before. The hope that de Gaulle will be able to reverse the decline of democracy in France may or may not be vain.

French experience of the last 150 years has been one of many shifts and turns. France has found herself repeatedly at the crossroads between a liberal democracy and an authoritarian militarist nationalism. In spite of crises and counter-revolutions French liberal democracy has reasserted itself again and again. In the long run French democracy can put more reliance upon men of the type of Vincent Auriol than on de Gaulle. On February 12, 1959, it was announced that Auriol, the first President of the Fourth Republic, had resigned, after 54 years, from membership in the Socialist party. Like Mollet, he had supported Charles de Gaulle in May, 1958. But for years he had opposed Mollet's "desiccating opportunism" and his Algerian war policy. "Today," Auriol wrote in his letter of resignation from the Socialist party, "I see everything collapsing at a time when it is necessary to regroup, in a single great truly socialist organization with a high ideal and a clear doctrine adapted to the modern world, all the workers divided between the communist and the socialist

parties." Men like Auriol uphold the tradition of French democracy. He is not alone. There is no doubt that the forces of French democracy and the opposition to the ruthless war in Algeria are still strong in France.

The *gloire* which many Frenchmen apparently seek today in maintaining their empire and thus in compensating for their collapse in 1940 is an outdated *gloire*. It does not conform to the rapidly changing world of the mid-twentieth century. The glory of the French nation does not rest on imperial domination or military power but on literary and artistic genius and on an ability to find new, more liberal and more humane ways of individual life and social cooperation.

The Imperial Mirage

In the midst of all the many political changes of the last two centuries the French system of government has shown little aptitude for adjustment. Concessions were made in phraseology rather than in reality. In December, 1946, the newly-created *Union Française* officially rejected the colonial regime and the subjection of the African and Asian peoples to French domination. But it remained a piece of paper. Some French writers compared it with the British Commonwealth. They forgot that the members of the Commonwealth are independent nations with their own foreign policy, cooperating on a basis of strict equality. Nothing of that sort existed in the *Union Française*, nor does it exist in the *Communauté Française* which took its place in 1958.

Nevertheless, the *Communauté* marks definite progress which was, however, started by the *loi cadre* of June 23, 1956, one of the liberal steps taken by the Fourth Republic. General de Gaulle's plebiscite of September 28, 1958, went a step further. It gave the French colonies four choices: to continue the status quo; to join the centralist administration of metropolitan France; to attain autonomy, though in a strictly limited way, within the French community; or to gain independence.

Practically all important territories decided for autonomy; one alone, Guinea, under the leadership of Sekou Touré, chose independence. But even those who chose autonomy did it as a step towards independence. The

leaders in the French colonies do not reject close cooperation with France. France can count on a large fund of good will among them. But they wish to face France as equals. The French government apparently hoped not only to keep the autonomy of the colonies strictly limited but to maintain each of these new autonomous entities separated from its neighbors, so that France would have to deal with each of the 12 weak states singly. The old policy of divide and rule was to continue. At a time when the European nations rightly seek federation, such federal union or integration was denied to Arabs or Africans.

African Unification

But Africa is swept today not only by the demand for an end of the colonial regimes. The African leaders know well that the boundaries between the various colonies were drawn by imperial conquest and outside arrangements. The African peoples do not wish to form small states. They see no ideal in the weak independent nation-state. They are after all not nations. They are on the way from a tribal stage of social organization to a federal stage which will include perhaps one day the whole of Black Africa but in the near future will unite large contiguous areas of western, central and eastern Africa without regard to former colonial boundaries.

On January 17, 1959, representatives of four of the new autonomous territories of French West Africa, the État du Sénégal, the République Soudanaise, the République Voltaïque and the République du Dahomey, met in Dakar, the capital of Senegal, under the chairmanship of Léopold Sedar Senghor, Senegal's Prime Minister, and established the federal republic of Mali; they adopted the name of a former African state which between the eleventh and sixteenth century included most of West Africa. The preamble of the new constitution names the strengthening of "the African personality" within the *Communauté* as the principal goal. All participants in the congress of Dakar took an oath to devote themselves to missionary activities for African unity.

Two days later, on January 19, 318 delegates of the *Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire* met in Conakry, the capital

of Guinea, and elected Sekou Touré as President. They demanded the unity of the trade unions of Black Africa and North Africa. In the same month, the Belgian government unexpectedly promised democratic reforms and future independence to the peoples of the Belgian Congo. Nigeria with 35 million inhabitants, the Cameroons, and Somalia will become independent African nations in 1960. All this represents a development which five years ago, in some aspects, even one year ago, few people would have thought possible.

At the end of December, 1958, Senghor declared at a federalist conference in Bamako, the capital of the French Sudan:

We are ready to remain in the *Communauté* as long as it opens up for us the road to the establishment of federal states in Africa and to the progressive grant of independence on the basis of an alliance with France. For that end the constitution must be interpreted in a dynamic way.

Will the Fifth Republic accept this dynamism? The African leaders, in North Africa as well as south of the Sahara, have been educated by France. They love the French language and the French civilization. But they also learned from France the importance of human dignity and equality, of cultural personality and national sovereignty. They wish to achieve these goals on the basis of federation among themselves and of cooperation with France. This is as true of the Federation of the Maghreb, which will include Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, as it is of the Federation of West- and Equatorial Africa. In an alliance on the basis of equality among these federations and France lies not only the best hope for cooperation in the free world but also for the growth and survival of democracy in France and in Africa.

Hans Kohn has been a student of nationalism for many years. Among his many books are *Making of the Modern French Mind* (1955), *American Nationalism* (1957) and *The Idea of Nationalism, A Study in its Origins and Background*, which was published in 1944 and is now in its seventh printing.

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CENTRAL AMERICA

The Crisis and the Challenge

by

John D. Martz

author of *Communist Infiltration of Guatemala*

At the end of World War II no geographic area seemed more promising than Central America—each of the six republics confidently anticipated at least a decade of material, social, and political progress. Today the very specters which were to be dispelled—communism, rampant nationalism, illiteracy, poverty, dictatorship—are as strong as before. What are the reasons behind this catastrophic failure? What are the chances for democracy in these lands with no democratic heritage? What forces are at work now? This, the only recent book on Central America, brilliantly analyzes and discusses each republic in turn. It paints a fascinating, detailed portrait of a vital area in crisis—and reveals the shocking failure of U.S. foreign policy during the past thirteen years.

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In the Third Republic, "Legislation moved slowly; found its way uneasily through uncharted swamps of compromise, and responded inadequately to national need and popular will. . . ." Although the political system was adequate before 1914, it proved ineffective in the inter-war years.

The Legacy of the Third Republic

By DONALD C. MCKAY

Late Anson D. Morse Professor of History, Amherst College

THE SYMPOSIUM in this issue of *Current History* quite properly focusses attention on the dynamic and still confused character of the "Gaullist Revolution." How little the French expected this extraordinary event was etched out for the writer in rather dramatic form when he and a colleague enjoyed a quiet luncheon in a small Left bank restaurant with the present premier of France in early April of last year. Our discussion with Michel Debré, whom we happened to have known in a professional connection for a number of years, touched at various points on the possible future of de Gaulle, of whom Debré has long been a devoted follower. But the conversation proceeded along leisurely professional paths, and clearly no one of us thought that the General's coming to power was in any sense imminent.

Now, with our attention riveted on this changed, and still rapidly changing, French scene, the Third Republic can usefully be viewed as a vestibule to this development, and indeed even more to the whole period since the fall of France. Herbert Butterfield's warnings to the contrary, we shall set out on our journey into this past with the substantial baggage of our concerns and anxieties about the present. For in the history of the Third Republic are to be found a host of helpful clues to the understanding of the contemporary scene. On this Republic, the writer has a candid bias: he sees it as bifurcated by the War of 1914, with French strength and confidence deeply eroded by that traumatic experience, so that problems which were hidden or endurable before 1914 tended to become evident or critical during the inter-war years.

The social structure of the Third Republic offers an initial set of useful clues. To the casual visitor, Paris may seem to be France, but in reality this is a peasant land. In 1846 the census classed three-quarters of the population as rural, and even in 1931 this figure stood at almost 50 per cent. The peasant is parochial in his interests, deeply attached to the land and to traditional ways

Donald C. McKay taught at Harvard University for many years before he joined the faculty at Amherst College in 1956. He was the author, among other works, of *The United States and France* (1951), and editor of a biographical series, *Makers of Modern Europe*, and the *American Foreign Policy Library*. He has served as a trustee of the Harvard-Yenching Institute (1950-1956) and of the World Peace Foundation (1953-1959). As a member of the World Peace Foundation he helped plan one conference of French and American leaders at Arden House in March, 1956, resulting in the publication of *Diversity of Worlds*, by Raymond Aron and August Heckscher, and a second conference at the *Institut d'Etudes Politiques* in Paris in March, 1958. Dr. McKay, who was directing some graduate students at Harvard University, had been appointed a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University, 1959-1960. The editors of *Current History* regret the untimely death of Professor McKay on April 2, 1959.

of dealing with it, very tax-conscious, and generally opposed to reform and "progress" for himself or for others. He has never been assimilated to the industrial society as has the farmer in the United States. The basic conservatism and relative inflexibility of French political life owe much to the psychology of the peasant.

At the other pole from the peasant in the pre-1789 regime were the nobility, who, despite their shattering experiences in the Great Revolution, in 1830, and in 1848, managed to stage a theatrical revival in 1871. They failed to provide a king for France, but the struggle of the monarchists and their rivals finally left a strong mark on the unfortunate constitutional compromise of 1875, whose influence extended right down to the demise of the Fourth Republic last year. But this was a sunset scene, for the nobility was soon to be compromised by both Boulangerist and Dreyfusard crises before it finally retired into the luminous pages of Marcel Proust and the arresting but unreal gestures of Charles Maurras.

Still another significant element in the social scene was the small shopkeeper, who dated originally from pre-industrial France, but for whom the Industrial Revolution witnessed a fresh proliferation. He has remained a picturesque but often parasitic growth on the economy—and more recently formed the core of the Poujadist movement.

Second product of the Industrial Revolution was of course the city proletariat, which grew rapidly during the regime of Napoleon III, but much more rapidly during the wider industrialization at the turn of the century. During most of his history the French worker has inhabited an unreal and paradoxical world. Initially, in the 1890's, a weak and inchoate labor movement adopted the quixotically violent slogan of the "general strike." On the political front, the workers, in characteristic French fashion, produced no fewer than nine Socialist sects before 1900, and in the years after final unity in 1905, the Party garbed itself in the confusing ambivalence of a propaganda of violent revolution coupled with a realistic program of gradualism. It had in fact, by putting water in its wine, set out on the reformist quest for petit bourgeois and peasant votes, and by 1914 found itself the largest party in the Chamber. Super-

ficially the Party at that time seemed to be on the road to a career like that of the growing Labor Party in England, but both domestic influences and international events decreed otherwise. Following the war, the great prestige of the workers' revolution in Russia sundered the Party, and the French Communists embarked on their long erosion of the Socialist ranks. As the workers in the 1930's, and increasingly after 1944, looked to the Communists for leadership, they once again compromised their position by placing their destinies in the hands of men whose prime concern was to do Moscow's political will.

The failure of a weak and divided labor movement to provide an effective goad to industrial efficiency is not unconnected with the character of French business leadership. We have only begun seriously to study the latter, but it is already clear that much of it during the Third Republic had an aversion to risk-taking, reflecting the family character of substantial parts of French business and a relatively assured market, sheltered behind comfortable tariff walls. The hard-driving competitive spirit of the Weberian entrepreneur was only too often lacking, and the marginal producer was allowed to set the price. Nor was the worker keen to contribute added productivity for an employer who, he suspected, would pocket most of the increase.

Two Economies

The French themselves like to refer to their economy as "balanced"—an agriculture which has been nearly self-sufficient, an industrial plant not extensively dependent on foreign trade. Actually it would be more accurate to say that there has long existed what one close observer describes as two juxtaposed and contrasting sectors here: "France A," the modern, up-to-date, progressive aspects of the economy (steel, automobiles, the railroads, large scale mechanized agriculture, and so on) and "France B," the archaic moraine, representing deposits reaching far back into the Old Regime (the Poujadist sector of retail trade, the myriad small and atomized agricultural holdings, the excessive addiction to hand labor in countless enterprises such as street paving, and so on). On the chronological scale, the

most striking contrast in French industry is between the rapid upswing in such fields as steel prior to 1914 (when the latter was increasing production, in percentage terms, more rapidly than that of the steel business in Britain, the United States or Germany) and the inter-war situation when, after a brief but vigorous expansion in the late 1920's, industry was paralyzed by the Great Depression, and a stagnant economy was producing in 1938 hardly more than it had produced in 1913.

Change and Revolution

The analysis of social structure and the economy leads us naturally into the closely interrelated sphere of political institutions. Here a contrast can usefully be made with England, where it has been pointed out that the political revolution preceded the industrial revolution by a century, whereas France was obliged to face the problems of both during the years from 1789 to 1914. One result was that England, with stabler and tradition-tested institutions, could make deep-going changes in her political arrangements during the nineteenth century by means of legislative acts and without violence. France, on the other hand, found it almost impossible to resolve the problem of constitutional reform by the processes of peaceful discussion and legislative enactment, and almost invariably fundamental changes came in the setting of a revolutionary overturn. Even the constitutional reforms of de Gaulle were made possible only by the revolutionary situation in Algeria, which on this occasion was prevented, almost miraculously, from proceeding through a violent stage by the prestige of the General himself. This last was to that extent an "incomplete" revolution, and there are many who fear—or hope—that it may still be completed.

Faced then at various times in the history of the past two centuries by both defective political arrangements and by a lack of the width of consensus which in England permitted peaceful change, France has been obliged—if we may be permitted a kind of hyperbole—to make revolution almost an unstated and paradoxical part of her successive constitutions—destined to remedy in the final analysis the weaknesses which the founding fathers repeatedly left.

Unfortunately for the Third Republic, the Revolution of 1870–1871, like its predecessors, spoke an ambiguous language. When news of the Napoleonic disaster at Sedan reached Paris, Republican elements in the Chamber proclaimed the Republic. But when these same Republicans sought patriotically to fight on to the last ditch against the invader, the mass of their war-weary compatriots elected a National Assembly of the peacefully inclined, an Assembly which turned out to be so strongly monarchist that it decided to remain in power and give France a king. The doctrinaire "purity" of the Bourbon candidate, the Count of Chambord, frustrated their intent, and so the Orleanist and conservative bourgeois Republican elements finally devised the tissue of compromises which became the so-called Constitution of 1875, for some, only a "waiting room" until the death of Chambord should make the Orleanist candidate legitimate.

The fears and hopes of the founders merged to give the new system a weak executive and a nominally powerful Chamber. Unfortunately in the traditional multi-party setting, the Chamber discovered that it could exercise its power admirably in the *negative* sense of overturning successive ministries (and thus preventing the development of excessive power by any individual—a persistent spectre from the Second Empire). Moreover, following the MacMahon fiasco of 1877, the Chamber enjoyed an almost complete amnesty from the danger of dissolution, hence its power was further increased by a virtual divorce from popular influence over considerable periods of time. But in the *positive* sense, for providing responsible and long-term influence on legislation through the machinery of a ministry with a well formulated program and reliable majority support, this system proved woefully defective. Legislation moved slowly, found its way uneasily through uncharted swamps of compromise, and responded inadequately to national need and popular will—the latter never adequately tested by elections which were regularly based on local issues.

Too Much Stability?

The regime of 1875, which was in large measure to be re-enacted in 1946 as the Con-

stitution of the Fourth Republic, has been widely attacked for the "instability" to which it led. It is true that governments tended to be shortlived, but increasingly—and never more clearly than as a result of recent events—critics have seen even greater weaknesses in excessive stability and conservatism. The deputies themselves rapidly acquired that typical political egocentrism which made them extremely reluctant to consider constitutional change: an effective dissolution procedure, for instance, could endanger their security in office. Prior to 1914 the interest in constitutional change among the deputies was very small indeed, and the last gasp of protest from the Pflimlin government in 1958 was in part a reflection of the persistence of this self-concerned sentiment.

This too great stability was also fostered by the continuance in 1875 of the administrative system of the first Napoleon. A centralized system, designed for the effective control of the entire nation by a dictator, seemed at the very least a paradoxical adjunct for a new Republic, and the more so as the latter's basically democratic character was presently revealed by events. Grass roots democracy, in the sense of local concern and local control, could not exist in any important way. And the central administration itself was staffed by men of high competence but often of conservative views: for both reasons they have been in a consistent position to assert their influence in the interstices of the weakness of ministries, both ephemeral and amateur.

In the case of the political system, as in so many other directions, the War of 1914 was a watershed. Before the war, the system functioned with considerable effectiveness, amidst problems which were less drastic and in the hands of a leadership which was altogether exceptional—one has only to recount the names: Gambetta, Ferry, Waldeck-Rousseau, Jaurès, Clemenceau, Briand, Barthou, Poincaré. But in the inter-war years, faced by the unexpected onslaught of the Great Depression and by the formidable challenge of the Hitlerian revolution, French political arrangements proved inadequate. France failed to meet either of these challenges, and in the end a divided ministry virtually abdicated, at Munich, her independence in the field of foreign affairs. The outspoken de-

termination of large numbers of Frenchmen to make a sweeping and fundamental change in political institutions after the Second World War is important evidence of public sentiment concerning this weakness.

Foreign Affairs

The foreign policy of the Third Republic does not, alas, offer many directly profitable lessons to the leaders of today, functioning as they are in a very different world. The story of the earlier cycle, from 1871 to 1914, involves the brilliant escape from the shackles of isolation contrived by Bismarck, and the successive steps in the reemergence of France as a great power and central figure in the system of opposing alliances. Viewed in terms of satisfaction of her wounded *amour propre* or as a demonstration of the great technical skill of her diplomats, this was an achievement of the first order. But seen as one of the elements which made a general war possible, and which brought in turn the devastating effects of that struggle to France herself, this triumph has its sobering and deeply ironical implications.

The second cycle of the Third Republic's foreign policy, that of the inter-war years, is full of the lessons of what not to do and of the pains of living in Wonderland with Alice while the real world is full of authentic perils. These were, it goes without saying, lessons for the British and for Americans as well. We were partners in error, a grim form of co-operation, and one not unappreciated by the totalitarian leaders. In the case of France, she simply had the bad fortune to be geographically most accessible to the enemy.

In these years following the First World War, France emerged once again into an isolated position in the international scene, which recalls in some ways her isolation after 1871. But there is a fundamental difference. In the earlier case, her isolation was contrived by the enemy, by Bismarck. In the post-1918 instance, it was the work of her allies. For the parallel security treaties between the United States and France and Britain and France foundered on the shoals of the political debate over the Treaty of Versailles—and the League—in the United States. And the British, following the submersion of their primary fears with the sinking of the German fleet, gravitated away

from their erstwhile support of the French and reverted to a more traditional balance of power view of their continental responsibilities. Meanwhile, the Bolshevik Revolution had created a new enemy for the conservatively orientated French government, and the fascist coup in Italy raised the spectre of fresh nationalist conquest by her former ally in the Mediterranean.

The result was that France sought to escape from her isolation by creating an alliance system with secondary states left by the war, a kind of neo-Bismarckian gambit executed in an almost Graustarkian world. The paradox here lay in the fact that these implausible alliances were adequate as long as Germany was weak (and they were not needed), but that they were completely inadequate in the face of a revived and belligerent Germany except in the context of a determined and cooperative Britain and Russia. The cooperation France elicited from Britain was largely flaccid counsels of surrender. Meanwhile an ambivalent France, faced by the twin menaces of Hitler and the growing strength of Communist Russia, elected to choose neither horn of that dilemma but instead to arm herself with half a coat of mail (the unfinished Maginot line), a national psyche converted to pacifism, and a negation of policy which was rationalized as appeasement. The result was the disaster we know.

Colonial Affairs

There remains to say a word about the colonial question under the Third Republic, especially since Algeria is still the most forbidding of all the problems which de Gaulle faces. Like the British earlier, the French acquired their Second Empire overseas in a fit of absence of mind. It was an anomaly that Frenchmen, defeated in a continental war with Germany and suffering from the weakness of diplomatic isolation, should embark on an adventure overseas which was rapidly to create an empire second in size only to that of Britain. This was a brilliant achievement, surely a tribute to talents of a very high order. But it was the work of a small group of believers and enthusiasts—soldiers, missionaries, diplomats, journalists, adventurers—and was accomplished in the face of the rugged opposition of men like

Clemenceau, who believed that France should concentrate her strength against the traditional enemy, and in a general setting of national apathy.

Then over the decades there happened what we have seen only too generally in the colonial world. France, with the other Western nations, provided a double goad to the growth of sentiment for colonial independence: the generous ideas of the West on human freedom and the dignity of the individual stirred the native populations as they had stirred Europeans many decades earlier, and the very presence of Europeans (especially those seeking private gain in a setting of competitive values) further stimulated native resentment and desire for independence. And so the native populations formulated their own revolutionary programs, directed against those very societies which had known revolution much earlier but which had by now settled into those traditional psychic patterns which made it so difficult for them to comprehend, much less sympathize with, the very lessons they had taught.

The explosive character of the last stages of the colonial revolution in our day, as seen in Algeria and in so many parts of Africa south of the Sahara, is bitter testimony to the incongruent nature of imperialism and liberalism, as Cora DuBois has noted in another context. For the totalitarian powers, addicted to the use of force at home, imperialist objectives abroad, also resolved by force, have a recognizable logic of their own. But the liberal West should long ago have discovered that in the realm of ideas, a people cannot have one range for domestic consumption and another for foreign export. One danger in France of the present time is precisely that the crisis over Algeria might see an alarming new congruence established between nationalism and imperialism by the triumph of the ideas of the Right. The remains of her overseas empire, which once evoked so little concern from most Frenchmen, has now become an emotion-laden symbol of an earlier and now regretted power position in the world.

Even this brief revisit of the Third Republic suggests once again the extent to which present-day problems are deeply

(Continued on page 288)

According to this author, the tragic failure of the Fourth Republic lay in its weak and inflationary economic policies. "France still lives in the old nineteenth century economy. . . . For many, this way of life is pleasant and most are ready to defend it bitterly against any change. It was they and their politicians who made the final choice that destroyed the Fourth Republic."

The Failure of the Fourth Republic

BY EDWARD W. FOX

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IF the Fifth Republic lives long enough to develop a full ethos and to produce an official history, the Fourth will undoubtedly go down in this account as an interlude of willful wandering in the parliamentary wilderness while Moses sat anxiously waiting for his chosen people in the gate house to the Promised Land at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises. But now, when the memories of the past 12 years are still fresh and crowded and the Fifth Republic has not yet filled the horizon between us and the past, it is a good time to reappraise the record, to reconsider the Fourth Republic not merely as a regime that finally crumpled under great strain but also as a phase in the life of France, in many ways one of the happiest and most promising in the memory of living Frenchmen. This is not to deny the final denouement of the story, but rather to assess its causes, to gauge if possible to what extent the fatal flaws were mechanical and constitutional, or political and moral. Did the disaster follow inevitably, as General de Gaulle would have it, on the failure of the French to choose the right constitution in 1946, or, as Pierre Mendès France implied in his famous title ("To Govern Is to Choose"), on a failure to choose at all?

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On the morrow of the Liberation, the French were confronted with an array of choices which would have been paralyzing if they hadn't also offered the possibility of fulfilling the bright and generous hopes that had been born in the night of occupation and travail of the Resistance. There was the choice not only of the form the new Republic would take, but the form of the new society itself. There was the choice of making France a modern industrial state, of its relations to the new European community, not to mention its relations with its territories overseas. And since every choice involved the outlay of public funds, there was the choice of how the costs of the state would be met. Each answer, whether for better or worse, contributed to the formation of the new regime, to its achievements and to its ultimate collapse.

The first, and quite probably the fatal, decision was made immediately following the Liberation when M. Pierre Mendès France, Minister for Economic Affairs in the Provisional Government, lost his fight for a policy of austerity, a firm currency and a balanced budget. Perhaps, in view of other choices being made, such a policy was not possible; but the consequent chronic inflation was destined to become the fatal weakness of the new regime.

The new France promised in the mythology of the Resistance was to provide true personal liberty founded in complete social fraternity and basic economic equality. No new regime could wholly have ignored this moral commitment and the Provisional Government moved rapidly to develop a full

social welfare program and to extend the already considerable national ownership. To the public agencies of communication (rail, sea and air lines as well as post, telegraph and telephone) were now added public utilities (gas and electricity), coal mines, most of the big banks and insurance companies, and the industrial plants of certain convicted collaborators, particularly Renault. If these choices were inevitable, both politically and morally, and in the long run indubitably beneficial, there is no question that for some time they added an all but crushing burden to the country's shaky financial structure.

To support this structure and provide all Frenchmen with at least the minimum common decencies of civilized existence obviously would involve much more than restoring the damaged houses, factories and transport facilities. The economic base of pre-war France had quite simply been inadequate to its task, and a group of experts working under the brilliant Jean Monnet were elaborating a plan for the orderly and organic expansion of industrial production. The decision to modernize France was perhaps made only in principle at first, but it was implicit in all the other choices being made and it was to lay its claim on the financial resources of the new state. It was also to imply a commitment to participate increasingly in the emerging new European community.

Such then were the principal choices that had already been made when the first Constituent Assembly met in 1946 to choose the form of government within which the French were to live. In French constitutional experience, the only alternatives to a bicameral parliamentary regime with a responsible ministry, which had characterized the now detested Third Republic, were the omnipotent assembly of the revolutionary First Republic and the irresponsible executive of the administrative government of the Bonapartes. Without doubt popular inclination would have leaned toward the revolutionary assembly; indeed, the first draft constitution sketched such a government. By the time that this proposal was presented to the country in a referendum, however, it had become painfully clear to all but the Socialists that the Communists viewed the constitution as an engine of *coup d'état*. As a result it was

defeated, a new assembly was elected, and a new compromise constitution was drafted. To the disgust of General de Gaulle, even this second assembly ignored his advice and warnings, refusing to formulate the presidential regime which he was demanding and which would, in effect, have established administrative rule tempered only by parliamentary review.

The inevitable compromise between these two extremes was quickly drafted and presented to the voters in a second referendum. Revealing an embarrassing family resemblance to the unlamented Third, it pleased no one but was accepted *faute de mieux* in a listless vote. In the meantime, General de Gaulle had stalked from the political scene in glacial fury, only to return briefly to curse the new Republic and predict its speedy and dishonorable end.

In strict logic, the fact that the General's prediction came true does not establish the validity of the analysis on which it was based, but in political tradition it almost certainly will, thereby attributing French difficulties of these past years to the weakness of the constitution, a doctrine which, if wrong, could be dangerous. Actually, the government of the Fourth Republic, with its National Assembly elected directly and its Council of the Republic, indirectly by universal suffrage, its executive responsible to the Assembly and its titular head of state elected by joint session of both chambers, proved to reflect the views of the electorate with essential accuracy, to assess national problems astutely, and even to produce ministers of ability. Its failure to accept the implications of its own policies and to carry them through to fulfillment can be understood only in the context of the history of postwar France.

The same constitutional document that established the Fourth Republic also created out of all the colonies, overseas territories and protectorates, the new French Union. Like the Republic, the Union turned out to be less revolutionary than had originally been planned. Instead of a free and voluntary association it became simply an "association," its population, instead of having full and equal rights as citizens of France, was encouraged to look forward to the eventual award of that ultimate status. The result-

ing constitution of the Union could still be considered relatively generous and progressive, but this did not mitigate the consequences of the choice against the free and voluntary association which might have spared the Republic the unending colonial warfare which finally brought about its fall.

In the spring of 1947 the prospects of the new Republic were scarcely encouraging. French industrial and agricultural production was still inadequate to maintain even a subsistence standard of living, the inevitable imports had stretched the national credit to the breaking point, and, no bigger than a man's hand, the first cloud of war had appeared on the horizon of Indochina.

At this juncture, in an act of unprecedented statesmanship, the American Secretary of State launched the program of massive aid which was to bear his name. The Marshall Plan saved Europe, but not without setting loose a flood of events which was to sweep the free world through the next half dozen years. Saved from immediate disaster by this turbulent tide, the French Republic rushed from crisis to achievement and from achievement to crisis without time to assess the implications of its course.

Secretary Marshall's formula for administering the new aid called the European Economic Community into existence. The French government took the lead in organizing Europe's response, and in developing new agencies of cooperation, particularly the European Coal-Steel Pool. It did not, of course, go unnoticed that three great architects of Europe, France's Schuman, Germany's Adenauer, and Italy's de Gasperi, were Catholic and conservative, and the republican Left made repeated efforts to bring socialistic Britain into the emerging community, but never seriously considered the possibility that France could remain outside.

In the meantime, the U.S.S.R. reacted to the American challenge by the *coup* in Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin and the re-mobilization of the Communist parties as agencies of subversive action. With no effective military force between the Red Army and the Atlantic, the European democracies and the United States were shocked by the magnitude of the threat. American aid was diverted from economic to military reconstruction and the rearma-

ment of Germany became the charismatic goal of our policy in Europe. The French at first seemed prepared to make an issue of the revived *Wehrmacht*, but in the confusion of events allowed themselves to be persuaded to propose a "European army," which was to be formulated in the controversial treaty of the European Defense Community.

With the Soviet relaxation of the blockade in 1949, the desperate Berlin airlift began suddenly to acquire the aura of victory and in the spring of 1950 the prospects for France and Europe seemed to mend. French industrial and agricultural production were both surpassing the pre-war levels of 1939 and, if still inadequate to the country's needs, were still rising steadily. Then, at the end of June, Communist forces invaded South Korea and American occupation troops were ordered to fight.

The American action unquestionably consolidated the French will to resist. America's full commitment in the East-West struggle was demonstrated and the French suddenly saw themselves fighting a meaningful war in Indochina, shoring up the perimeter of the free world there as we were doing in Korea. But American rearmament precipitated a drastic rise in world prices and the inevitable result in France was another increase in the already dangerous inflation. Such was the state of affairs when the first Assembly approached the end of its mandate and France faced the election of 1951.

In spite of a major campaign by de Gaulle and his revived Rally of the French People to capture the Republic through the elections, the only real issue was the Communist threat. Many voted against the Communists by voting for their traditional parties, but several million saw in de Gaulle the most dramatic symbol of anti-Communist resistance. As a result, the R.P.F. emerged the largest group in the new Assembly and, to the dismay of its supporters, voted with the Communists in automatic opposition to the government in an effort to pull the Republic down. The tactic failed, the R.P.F. disintegrated, and the other parties, now harassed only by the Communists, continued to contend with a new wave of problems.

At first it appeared that the most urgent business confronting the new Assembly was

the war-provoked inflation. An experiment in voluntary price control worked for nearly a year, giving the economy a much needed breathing space, if providing no ultimate solution to the problem, and in the summer of 1952, with industrial and agricultural production soaring above the all-time high of 1929, with Nato a reality, the Communist party on the defensive and even some irresponsible reports of military successes in Indochina in circulation, France seemed to be emerging from the shadow of her worst difficulties.

The spell was rudely shattered by the American presidential election. Eisenhower's readiness to buy votes with the prospect of peace in Korea and Dulles' strident promises of a "roll-back" in Eastern Europe did much to discredit American leadership. With the liquidation of the Korean war, France found her role in Indochina ambiguous and the continuation of the war an open political issue.

A government crisis in June, 1953, brought forward Pierre Mendès France, long accepted as the financial expert of the Assembly, as a major contender for the Presidency of the Council. In outlining his program he proposed to cure the chronic inflation by balancing the budget through drastic cuts in military appropriations, the necessary corollary of this policy being the cessation of hostilities in Indochina. Although his bid was rejected, Mendès France emerged from the attempt as the most important political figure in France.

A year later, with the French army reeling under the disaster of Dien-bien-phu, Mendès was swept into office with an all but universal mandate to make peace. This he did with a display of energy and impatience that had not been seen in a French statesman since Clemenceau "made war."

Before Mendès could drive on in his self-appointed task of restoring order in the Republic's finances by liquidating her vastly over-extended commitments, he was forced to resolve the fate of the still-pending treaty of the European Defense Community. Viewed as the crowning achievement of their work by the architects of the "little" or Catholic Europe, Messieurs Bidault, Schuman and their colleagues of the M.R.P. (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*), the

treaty had nevertheless gradually lost support. The Defense Community seemed less urgent in the balmy climate of the post-Stalin "thaw" and the imminent prospect of placing French recruits under the command of old *Wehrmacht* NCO's began to appear macabre. Mendès, himself no partisan of little Europe and convinced that the treaty couldn't be saved, refused to stake his government on its passage and abandoned it to ignominious defeat.

Whether dismayed or not by the violent reaction of the supporters of E.D.C., Mendès swept on to seek a new European army agreement, to attempt a negotiated solution to Franco-Tunisian tensions, and to attack the scandalous alcohol subsidies which constituted one of the most serious remaining drains on the budgets. In this last, he challenged directly the most powerful lobby in France and, by implication, all the lesser vested interests. The postwar French community, like its budget, had been built up by a precarious balancing of special privileges. From this point on, each favored group saw Mendès France as its enemy and realized that its days or his would be numbered. In the first week of February, his cabinet fell.

In the summer of 1955, serious trouble broke out in the French departments of Algeria. At first it was overshadowed by more spectacular developments in Tunisia and Morocco, but gradually the army, now repatriated from Indochina, was moved into Algeria and as the fall wore on, France was forced to recognize the fact that she was fighting still another major war. Simultaneously, it became apparent that Mendès France, having gained control of the old Radical Socialist party, was planning to build a new political force, apparently on the model of Roosevelt's New Deal, and to conduct a major campaign in preparation for the parliamentary elections scheduled for the following June. To hope for important electoral success, however, Mendès realized that it would be necessary to modify the existing electoral law, returning to the traditional single-member constituency of the Third Republic. The issue was immediately seized on by his opponents in the Assembly as the most tangible weapon to be used against his intangible successes in the country at large. Brought to a vote late in No-

vember, the proposed electoral reform seemed to be making some headway until Edgar Faure staked the life of his ministry on its defeat, and lost. Ironically, however, the situation was so confused that the opposition overplayed its hand and defeated the minister by an absolute majority, thereby allowing him to invoke a previously unused provision of the constitution and to dissolve the Assembly.

Thus capping his opponent's clumsy error with his own deft stroke, Edgar Faure at once cut short Mendès France's electoral campaign and forced him to fight it within the framework of the old electoral law. The *Canard Enchaîné* summed up the situation with the headline: "Faure Calls For Sudden Re-elections." His fellow deputies recorded their opinion of the maneuver by sitting up all night to force him to date the decree of dissolution December 2, the anniversary of Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état*.

In the month intervening before the elections, Mendès France formed an alliance with the Socialists and dissident Gaullists under the label of Republican Front, and conducted a remarkable campaign in which he urged his fellow Frenchmen to join him not merely in restoring order to the finances, but in remaking the entire economy of the country by sacrifice and hard work. Whether such a program could have succeeded is impossible to say, but it is hard to see how France can ever meet her obligations—social, fiscal, or military—by less thorough measures. And there is no doubt that millions of voters believed Mendès' plan would work, not merely his passionate supporters, but an even greater number of bitter opponents who believed his very success would destroy their way of life. Half the population of France still lives in the old nineteenth century economy that has never been displaced by the still incomplete industrial revolution. For many, this way of life is pleasant, and most are ready to defend it bitterly against any change. It was they and their politicians who made the final choice that destroyed the Fourth Republic.

If the elections had not been called early and if the electoral law had been revised, the results might have been different. Under existing conditions, however, the results were more or less accurately foreseen. The

Republican Front won only a token victory, the Communists, profiting by electoral mechanics, increased their representation by 50 seats (which the intelligent M. Faure apparently thought a cheap price for stopping Mendès) and, rather to the general surprise, Poujade's anti-tax forces elected nearly 50 deputies. The situation in the Assembly was much what it had been in 1951, with an automatic opposition of 200 out of nearly 600 votes.

President Coty called on the technically victorious Republican Front to form the new government, but addressed the invitation to M. Guy Mollet as head of the Socialist party, the largest group in the coalition. There was momentary hope that Mollet might step aside for the real leader of the Front, but in a demonstration of the poverty of doctrinaire politics, he accepted, as his duty to his Party, and led the Fourth Republic toward its doom.

It took another year and a half to play the tragedy out against the background of the sordid, vicious war in Algeria. The wild Suez adventure, the mounting irresponsible intransigence of the Algerian colonials, the grim desperation of harassed and abandoned professional troops, and the juvenile prospecting and posturing of apprentice dictators all crowd the scene, but there was only one possible denouement. The government in Paris was bankrupt, not merely of money but of ideas, and it was paralyzed. Any bloc of 100 deputies joining the permanent opposition could veto any measure, and any useful measure was bound to impinge on the interests of at least 100 deputies. Mendès France had been all but swept from the political arena by an unparalleled campaign of vilification and slander; there was only one man left France could turn to. For months the Paris papers of almost all political complexions had been demanding "How long?", when a grade B mob scene in Algiers precipitated the swarming of the political vultures. It was necessary to act, but it appeared that the government would not even be able to abdicate. Finally, after exacting the last ounce of justification, de Gaulle arrived. In his hands, France may well be safe, but how soon will there be another chance to choose? And what will the answer be?

This author is somewhat more optimistic about the future of France than is Hans Kohn. Of de Gaulle he writes: "Given peace, good management, good luck—above all, luck, when success depends so much on fragile lives like Konrad Adenauer's, on fragile combinations and moods like those now affecting French internal politics, on fragile loyalties like those of the army, on uneasy and uncertain hopes like those for settlement in Algeria—given survival, his policy may well pay off." Here is the story of French foreign policy from "the doldrums of anxious confusion" to . . .

An Anxious Pride: French Policy, 1959

By EUGEN WEBER

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SINCE history is a chronicle and interpretation of past events, not a prediction of the future, its writing often consists in backing horses that have won—in showing why things that happened happened as they did, and why things that might have happened did not. The facts at which we gaze, the patterns we discern or invent, become obvious because they are the ones that actually hatched out of a multitude of possibilities. Given, therefore, the prejudices with which we start, and given the temptation to treat our material as pretty well foreordained, interpretation is not difficult. It becomes more difficult when data is thin, when not interpretation but judgment and prophecy are called for, when the historian is not asked to explain the past but to predict the

future. He is now no longer writing a *History of the Turf*, so to speak, trying to show the How and, perhaps, the Why of the great races, horses and classics; he is on the course to bet or, at least, since it may prove less expensive and he has not the money anyhow, to offer his services as a tipster.

A Republic has recently ended—one more. A new regime is in power—yet another. What effects will this have on the foreign policy of France, on its attitude towards allies, enemies, or neutrals? What can we make out, what may we expect, amid the fuss and flutter of these new beginnings?

Faced with such questions, the historian dressed as prophet (mutton dressed as lamb) reverts to kind, turns to his habitual haunts, and suggests that the key to the future might be sought in the past—that certain factors already exist and can be examined in the belief that they will influence the policy of the Fifth Republic as they influenced that of the Fourth.

There are first to be considered the treaties, alliances and international bodies to which the country has been committed since the end of the war. There is public opinion: its orientation, prejudices and intensity on the various issues of foreign policy. And there is the personality of the country's leader, General de Gaulle: his opinions, his intentions (what we know of them, what we may infer from them). And in examining

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each of these things we assume that there are at least certain constants, certain tendencies that persist, through changes of government and changes of labels, to affect the doings of nations as they do those of individual men.

France is, of course, a member of the United Nations. But this, equally of course, does not exclude particular treaties with other nations or groups of nations. A bilateral agreement with Russia was signed by Charles de Gaulle on the morrow of Liberation and it still stands. So does the 1947 treaty of Dunkirk, by which Britain and France promised each other mutual aid in case of a renewed German aggression. At Brussels, in 1948, these two allies joined Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands in a treaty designed chiefly for collective defense, but also to further "collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters." Later joined by Italy and by the German Federal Republic, the Brussels Treaty became the Western European Union, lost its original anti-German character, and acquired a more up-to-date anti-Russian tone just when it had become obvious that West European defense against Russia was, by itself and in such classic terms, something of a lost cause.

No particular treaty exists between France and the United States, but both countries are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato), along with the other members of the Western European Union plus Canada, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Norway, Portugal and Turkey. Nato's permanent offices are in Paris, and near Paris stands its military headquarters—Shape. But Nato, set up in 1949 to cope with the Russian military threat, soon began to lose its original purpose as a conventional military alliance in the old pre-atomic style. By 1955, when, after prolonged wrangling, West Germany had been allowed to join, it had become rather hollow—more of a symbol than a reality. The concrete links between its Western members were being forged elsewhere: in the Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) with headquarters in Luxemburg that, since 1952, had pooled the coal and steel resources of France, Italy, West Germany and the Benelux countries; in the Common Market that the same

countries have just established; and in the Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) they also set up.

An Economic Community

The treaties that in 1951 enshrined the so-called Schuman Plan and set up E.C.S.C., the agreements that in 1957 established Euratom and the Common Market, must, if they work, if they are given time to work, create an economic unity among the member countries, a cat's cradle of common interests more difficult to unravel than that which, even guns apart, enforced union on the disunited States of America in the 1860's. Yet, when one presses beyond the platitudes of pious communiqués, there is reason to doubt the chances of arrangements which French governments have consistently violated in practice over the years. In the wake of the industrial recession that hit Europe this winter, throwing people out of work, lowering demand for most products, and piling up stocks of unsaleable coal and steel (among other goods), a great deal of friction in the body of the Coal and Steel Community has come to light in long and rather acrimonious discussion of prices and quotas that seem destined to make nonsense of the Common Market only a few weeks after its birth.

Part of the responsibility for these difficulties rests with the succession of French government which, eager to keep down the cost of living index, deliberately kept iron and steel prices low, mainly by skimping on reinvestments, and thus made nonsense of the liberal principles on which E.C.S.C. had been founded. The "High Authority" in Luxemburg has, over the years, proved incapable of enforcing the agreements that set it up and so the laws of the economic jungle have in fact long since replaced the rules of the treaty, with every member government violating the text when it suits it to do so, without bothering too much about coordinating its national policy with those of the other members.

There is no evidence that the new government of France will do anything materially to alter this situation, or to close the gap between good intentions and actual practice. It has, in the last few months, been forging ahead with economic measures designed to

further the Common Market and collaboration among its members. But this may be due, at least in part, to the wish to forestall other possibilities. The six-country Market has an alternative: a vaster free trade area urged by Britain and meant to be both looser and more inclusive. Faced, like Bismarck a century earlier, by the alternative of a smaller, firmer, union or a vaster one, de Gaulle opts for Little Europe. But for a Little Europe which will always be sacrificed to internal contingencies, and whose attractions in his eyes seem of the political rather than the economic order.

His reason for this should become apparent in due course. For the moment, however, we are left with a picture of France as party to treaties or organizations whose membership, not counting that of the United Nations, ranges from two to fifteen, and is not always the same. A multiple and complex structure of alliances is worse confounded by the birth or independence of new nations in Asia and Africa, by the shifts of the East-West struggle from Europe to the Orient, to the Middle East, and perhaps now back to Europe, by hostile relations with the Arab world and an increasingly cordial (though perhaps only temporary) *entente* with Israel, and by all the ambiguities and frictions that dog the associations of even the closest allies.

This is the backdrop against which French foreign policy must proceed, in a world overshadowed by the atom bomb and dominated by the rivalry of two enemy camps—East and West or (more specifically, at least for the moment and as seen from Europe) Russia and the United States. This is the concrete reality with which the French have to contend.

It is against this background and beset by the complications that develop and the new issues that arise from one moment to another, that French public opinion reacts and takes shape. And the first thing that might be said about it is that, among the preoccupations of the average Frenchman, foreign issues play a very minor part, coming well behind matters of internal policy, particularly those (if we leave out Algeria) that concern material interests: wages, prices, housing, unemployment and the like. This is natural enough—the closer to home, the

more interesting an issue tends to be. Thus, in 1951, the war in Korea or the Abadan crisis excited far less attention than the parliamentary discussion of educational issues; and, while the question of German rearmament interested more people than did Korea, their numbers still could not compare with those concerned above everything else with the price of meat at home. Evidently the French are no different in this matter from other people and other *peoples*, a fact recognized by newspapers from Los Angeles to Berlin when they feature national over foreign, and local over national, news.

For a people with a revolutionary reputation, the French have always been remarkably concerned with security; and the reflection of this concern in the foreign field is their desire for peace. For the last 12 years the world has been divided into two camps, and the French are acutely aware of it. They have chosen to side with the West, but only because they had to choose; and they do not like it. It is not the West as such that they do not like—far from it; but the need to choose, the situation in which each of the two opponents decrees that he who is not with him is against him. This is perhaps the essence of an attitude which has colored both popular reactions and official policies—the desire to escape the need to choose, and the inevitable resentment of a partnership to which one belongs only reluctantly and in a subordinate role.

If choice there must be, and this has been the case, France stands with the West without a question. But standing with the West is only a poor second-best to standing on neither side. The French, even those who are not Communists, do not want to fight world communism, or Russia, any more than they want to fight the United States. And the antagonism of the two great powers creates in their eyes a real threat to the peace that is their main interest.

There is little feeling in France for the "justice" of the Western cause, except insofar as it seeks to preserve the *status quo*. Like other Europeans who have noticed that its definition, like its sanctions, are matters of power and convenience, the French treat justice as a relative rather than an ultimate idea. When they hear that justice is on our side, they also hear the echo of the same

belief from the other shore. When they are told that Russia's expansionist tendencies threaten world peace they answer, rightly or wrongly, that the United States has similar tendencies, merely less brutally obvious. The situation as they see it is a power struggle for which responsibilities are divided, and those of Russia are only slightly greater than those of this country. Two Frenchmen in ten think that Russia is more guilty of war-mongering than any other country, one in ten would put the United States in first place, but four in ten hold both nations to be equally responsible for the troubled state of the world. Neither Americans nor Russians, think the French, do all they should, all they could, to avoid a war; neither really practice what they preach nor try to reconcile their peaceful words and their threatening gestures. There is nothing good to be said for Soviet policies, but little more for American; a plague on both their houses!

We must not make the tempting mistake of attributing such ideas only to the Communists, the fellow-travellers, the enemies of free enterprise or of this country. Obviously, a vote for the Communist party implies a certain sympathy with the things that Russia stands for; but not every Communist elector approves Russian policies. Conversely, anti-communism seems to go often with strong suspicion of American policies, suspicion that flourishes among reactionaries and conservatives no less than among Socialists. There are endless gradations from Pinay to Pineau and beyond; there are many different reasons for being anti-American to a greater or less degree; but the attitude does exist. Its existence, and the poor opinion that so many Frenchmen of all political orientations share of American policies no less than Soviet ones, goes a long way to explain their reluctance to take sides.

A "Third Force"

Even though most Frenchmen still remember the American "betrayal" at Suez with resentment, suspect United States policy in North Africa and the "infiltration" of American capital into oil-rich Sahara, there is, I repeat, little question as to what side France *should* take if she must take sides. France stands with the West to which she belongs by geography, tradition, interest and

affinities. But, if they were really free to choose, most Frenchmen would probably prefer to remain neutral. Hence the old talk of a "Third Force" that could stand on its own between East and West, talk that has died while the idea lives. Hence the insistence upon an effective European bloc which, able to match the others in population, resources and productivity, might create the possibility of independence that, in the public mind, means above all peace and disengagement but also the more effective protection of national interests and the enhancement of national prestige. This may, though only in part, explain the French reluctance to accept the vaguer, looser, British scheme of a free trade area with fewer chances of ever becoming a free power; and France's readiness to join Germany in a more restricted but potentially more effective union.

French-German Relations

For the recent *rapprochement* between Germany and France certainly needs some explaining. And it is not enough to say that the need for it was obvious and that common sense prevailed at last. Common sense seldom prevails in politics, or even in the more restricted, more professional, less democratic field of diplomacy, without support from other, less rational, motives. This is especially true when common sense is counterbalanced by such strong emotional factors as the French suspicion of, indeed hostility towards, Germany. Such suspicion and fear, bolstered by memories of the last three German wars and of secular rivalry between Bourbon and Habsburg, were strong enough to keep the scheme of an European Defence Community (E.D.C.) (including both Germany and France) in suspense for four years. Such suspicion caused it to founder at last in 1954, to be replaced by a Western European Union (including England to counterbalance French fears of German domination) patched up only at the last moment to avoid the agonizing reappraisals threatened by an aggravated John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State. Yet, only a few months later, we find the French (who had refused to accept any military arrangement including Germany without special safeguards and, above all, without the reassuring English presence) insisting on an economic arrange-

ment more binding than the E.D.C. they had rejected, and *excluding* England.

One may, of course, suggest plausibly that to old-fashioned patriots an economic treaty signifies less than a military one; that a pooling of economic resources is more easily accepted on the sentimental, emotional, plane and more easily evaded on the practical plane than a pooling of national defence forces; that to the superficial public eye one measure is less striking and, hence, less obviously suspect and irritating than the other. One might even add that de Gaulle may have accepted the German alliance in Europe only in exchange for German support in Africa and the Sahara where, significantly enough, one of the latest oil strikes was realized with German machinery contributed by the German partners of a Franco-Algerian firm. Where colonial interests are concerned, a patriotic Frenchman feels less suspicious of non-colonial Germany than of traditional competitors like Britain or unsympathetic critics like America.

But this very point takes us back to where we started: a would-be independent France cannot really preserve its freedom, let alone assert it, under the aegis of the United States or within the sort of loose, diversified, association of interests that the British like. If partnership there must be, let it be, Frenchmen say, with powers of our own kind whose interests, like ours, are not clearly enlisted on either side, whose aspirations, like ours, are towards autarchy and in- not inter-dependence.

Germany, of course, must be watched: her longing for reunion, her hankering for the lost lands beyond the Oder-Neisse line, are themselves threats to international stability and peace. But a strong, self-confident France may hope to hold such dangerous tendencies in check. Since Charles de Gaulle's accession to power French policy has regained the self-confidence as well as the capacity for decision that was so signally lacking during the last decade. It can face partnership with Germany without the qualms which, apart from the political incoherence of days gone by, made such a possibility difficult to envisage. And the way to become stronger is by joining with Germany in the first place. The aim, once again, is to avoid the threat of war.

And this tells us that, in the wider sphere of international relations, the French, aware like all Europeans of their vulnerable position in the middle, would favor anything that appears to ease tension and make a conflict less likely or less murderous: the control or prohibition of atomic arms (once they have their own), the Rapacki disengagement plan for central Europe, disarmament if possible, withdrawal of foreign troops from European soil—be they American or Russian. These are matters of public sentiment and may not always be reflected in policy. Yet politicians are also part of the public and cannot fail to be affected by the climate of opinion just as they, in turn, labor to affect it.

Of course, public sentiment is never single: it is made up of different strands and currents, fostered by different interests or groups, affected by events and by the men who ride the crest of events or try to. Which brings us to the third factor in the making of French policies today and possibly tomorrow—General de Gaulle.

De Gaulle's Aim

There is little to suggest that de Gaulle's own ultimate preoccupation is peace. Though peace and the problem of securing it for his country can never be far from his mind, that is not his chief concern. On the first page of his *Memoirs* he has told us that this was, is, and always will be—the greatness and the glory of France:

France cannot be France without grandeur [he writes]. This faith has grown with me in the *milieu* where I was born. My father . . . was full of the sentiment of the dignity of France. . . . My mother's unyielding passion for the fatherland equalled only her religious piety. My three brothers, my sister, myself, had as a second nature a certain anxious pride in our country. . . . Nothing struck me more powerfully than the symbols of our glory: night falling over Notre Dame, the majesty of evening at Versailles, the *Arc de Triomphe* in the sun, the conquered banners rippling under the arches of the *Invalides*.

We read here a poet with a sense of history, who has made a religion of his fatherland.

This poet became a general, a national hero, and twice within the last 15 years the savior, or apparent savior, of his land. From his present position of strength, through men like the premier, Michel Debré, who so far

aspires to be no more than his master's voice, he can regulate the country's doings as neither he nor others could have done in the previous 40 years. And his immediate concern is to restore that French power and prestige without which, as he has told us, the country can never hope to be itself.

Restoring French Prestige

A sound, or sounder, economic structure; the settlement, somehow, of the suppurating Algerian conflict; tangible evidence of grandeur in the councils of the West and in an atom bomb to call one's own; proofs of confidence in the freer convertibility of the franc and its official deflation; a firm tone with the nation's allies; one no less firm with the enemies of its allies: these are the points that have been made so far. A certain anxiety felt in Washington and London is matched by a new friendliness in Bonn and a very tentative easing of relations with Russia based not only on the classic ideas of a balance of power but also on the assumption (recently voiced by as exalted a personality as the Chief of the National Defense Staff, General Ely) that sooner or later the United States and the U.S.S.R., which are growing more alike every day, will have to stand side by side against the Chinese peril.

But in none of this is there anything new or unexpected. The General always shared his countrymen's resentment of overweening allies, their reluctance to go in too deep with one side and lose all touch with the other. He not only shared but voiced the feeling that France was decaying into mediocrity and division. He opposed the merging of French units in a European army, but not economic collaboration. And if his sus-

picious of Germany seem to have been lightly cast aside, it is only because he considers a wary *entente* with Germany better than subjection to other, more powerful, allies.

Given peace, good management, good luck—above all luck, when success depends so much on fragile lives like Konrad Adenauer's, on fragile combinations and moods like those now affecting French internal politics, on fragile loyalties like those of the army, on uneasy and uncertain hopes like those for settlement in Algeria—given survival, his policy may well pay off. For the moment it suits the public mood—hungry for the prestige and recognition that France has been denied for so long, hungry, too, for independence. The great majority probably envisage independence—disengagement—as a promise of security and peace, an opportunity to concentrate on peculiarly French concerns. De Gaulle knows that no French concern can be treated, that none any longer exist, independently, divorced from the wider issues and tangles of world policy. But in a world torn apart by the rivalries of great Leviathans, the new President of the Fifth Republic hopes that French interests can better be served by a reinvigorated nation, less beholden to others, less dependent on others.

No change of policy is entailed in this, no change of orientation; merely a new source of power, a new confidence, a new self-affirmation. France may not be destined for the eminence de Gaulle has dreamed of for her, but she can only benefit from the new enthusiasm and the utter faith he has to offer. "An anxious pride": his words provide the best description of the new tone of French foreign policy after a long spell in the doldrums of anxious confusion.

"The distinguishing feature of underdeveloped areas, even more than their current poverty, is the persistence of this poverty over time. This persistent poverty implies that whatever growth in aggregate output has occurred has been matched, or more than matched, by a growth of numbers in the population. Yet if one asks why total output has not grown more rapidly than population the basic answers seem to be outside the economic sphere. In an important sense, then, the really fundamental problems of economic development are noneconomic."—From the Twentieth Century Fund Study, *Approaches to Economic Development*, by Norman S. Buchanan and Howard S. Ellis.

"Is the French Community sufficiently flexible to adjust to changing conditions—notably to a demand by the smaller member states for a greater voice in their own affairs and the affairs of the Community as a whole?" This author thinks not: "Considering the developments in the neighboring African territories . . . the chances are slight that the French Community, in its present form, will satisfy the steadily mounting pressure of nationalism. What is more likely is the transformation of the French Community from a federation to a weaker confederation or an association of states along the lines of the Commonwealth."

De Gaulle's French Community

BY BENJAMIN RIVLIN

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DURING the course of his 13,000 mile trip to France's African territories last summer, General Charles de Gaulle advanced the idea that France's overseas dependencies had the right to self-determination even to the extent of choosing independence. Successively in Madagascar, Equatorial Africa and West Africa, de Gaulle made it clear that by voting "no" in the September 28 (1958) referendum on the new French Constitution a territory would in effect be seceding from France. Moreover, he indicated that even after voting "yes" and thereby becoming part of the new French Community, a territory could change its mind and decide to assume "its own destiny independently."¹

This promise of the permanent right of self-determination is in glaring contrast to de Gaulle's pronouncement at the opening of the Brazzaville Conference on January 30, 1944, that there is a "permanent bond

between France and her overseas territories."² René Plevin, de Gaulle's then Commissioner for the Colonies, told the conference that "there are populations whom we intend to lead step by step to personality, and the most mature of them will be given political franchise, but they desire no independence other than French independence."³ This conference called by General de Gaulle 15 years ago to consider the future relationship of France and the territories of the French colonial empire categorically rejected the idea of independence, even for the future:

The objectives of the task of civilization accomplished by France in her colonies rule out any idea of autonomy, any possibility of an evolution outside the French bloc of Empire; the eventual creation, even in the distant future, of autonomy for the colonies should be ruled out.⁴

Why this about face today? The answer lies in: 1) the victory of native nationalism throughout the erstwhile colonial world leading to the emergence of nearly a score of newly independent states; and 2) the failure of French efforts during this period to cope with these fast-moving developments.

France's answer to the spread of national-

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¹ "Premier de Gaulle Outlines the Draft Constitution," *Speeches and Press Conferences* No. 114, Ambassade de France, Service de Press et D'Information, New York, September, 1958, p. 3.

² "The African Conference at Brazzaville," *Free France*, February 1, 1944, p. 122.

³ Quoted in Herbert Luethy, *France Against Herself*, Praeger, New York, 1955, p. 218.

⁴ Daniel Boisdon, *Les Institutions de L'Union Francaise*, Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1949, p. 15.

ism was the "French Union" which was an outgrowth of the principles of the 1944 Brazzaville Conference. It was founded on the firm belief that it was not good for either the mother country or the overseas territories to be detached from one another. Providing institutional framework for this permanent attachment would be the French Union. Thus, the French Constitution of 1946, in establishing the French Union, spoke of France's intention "to guide the peoples for whom she has assumed responsibility toward freedom to govern themselves and democratically to manage their own affairs." However, lacking was any reference to obtaining the consent of the overseas territories to the Union or to their right of secession and independence. Furthermore, despite the Constitution's proclamation of equality, this Union was not an organization of equals on the style of the British Commonwealth but rather one in which the French Republic occupied a central and dominating position.

In actuality, the French Union was largely an unfulfilled dream—a camouflage for the perpetuation of the old colonial system. Internal self-government was the stated ideal but "legislation for the overseas territories remained in the hands of the French Parliament, and their administration was left in the hands of governors appointed by the French government, who enjoyed sole responsibility."⁵ It is not surprising, then, that the French Union proved no answer to the challenge of native nationalism in its overseas territories.⁶

From the very outset, the French Union was beset with menacing situations. Uprisings and armed revolts shook Indochina and Madagascar. Mounting nationalism in Morocco and Tunisia prevented these countries from assuming their expected role of Associated States in the French Union, while in Algeria the growing impatience of the Muslim population was steadily manifested. In Africa south of the Sahara, clear signs of trouble ahead were evidenced by scattered disorders and the expression of dissatisfaction with the French policy of assimilation, even among the most cultivated élite. France's responses to these situations were hardly within the spirit of the French Union's ideal of equality and the freedom of the dependencies to govern themselves. On the con-

trary, French policy can be characterized as authoritarian and suppressive, in the classical style of colonialism. Only in Madagascar did this policy succeed in stamping out the revolution. In Indochina and North Africa, the compounding of one inept policy upon another led to violence and eventually to the loss of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Morocco and Tunisia, and to bitter civil war in Algeria.

Throughout this period, France rationalized its position *vis à vis* its overseas dependencies: since nationalism was regarded as incompatible with the French Union, nationalism did not exist. That this amounted to gross self-deception was becoming patently evident. However, because of the strong emotionalism stirred up by the issue and the paralysis of the governmental machinery of the Fourth Republic, little could be done to rectify the situation in time to prevent the French debacle in Indochina and North Africa.

The Loi-Cadre of 1956

The lessons of this experience during the first decade of the French Union were not entirely wasted. In 1956, it became clear that unless something were done quickly, French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa would go the way of Indochina and North Africa. To meet this situation, the French government enacted the *Loi-Cadre* of June 23, 1956.⁷ This law and the consequent decrees made under it provided for administrative decentralization in French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa and Madagascar. Heretofore, power rested with the Governor General of each of these re-

⁵ Luethy, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

⁶ As originally conceived, there were four categories of members in the French Union aside from Metropolitan France. These were: (1) Overseas Departments of the French Republic, which were Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana, Reunion, and the three departments of Algeria; (2) Overseas Territories, which were French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, French Somaliland, Madagascar, Coromo Islands, New Caledonia, and New Hebrides, St. Pierre and Miquelon, and the French settlements in Oceania; (3) Associated States, which were Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in Indochina. While some French jurists argued that the protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia automatically became Associated States under Article 61 of the French Constitution of 1946 by virtue of protectorate treaties, neither became part of the French Union to the extent of formally adhering to it by treaty as did the States of Indochina or by participating in the activities of the organs of the French Union.

⁷ A *loi-cadre* is a law which establishes the framework within which the government may issue decrees on a given question. For description and text of the *Loi-Cadre* see "Political Evolution in the French Overseas Territories," *African Affairs*, No. 14A, Ambassade de France, etc., August, 1956.

spective territories. Under the 1956 reform, the eight territorial governments of French West Africa (Senegal, Mauritania, Sudan, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey and Niger), the four territories of French Equatorial Africa (Gabon, Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari and Chad), and the five provinces, the equivalent of the territories in Africa, (Antananarivo, Majunga, Fianarantsoa, Tamatave and Tulear), were to be given much of this authority.

Essentially this was the beginning of a limited transfer of power from the French metropolitan government to predominantly African governments. As part of this measure of internal autonomy, *Conseils de Gouvernements* were instituted in all of the territories. The *Conseil* was to be chosen from among the members of the already existing Territorial Assembly, to which it was responsible. Although each territory still had an appointed Governor-President, it was understood that the effective head of the *Conseil* would be the elected Vice-President of the Assembly. The Territorial Assemblies were granted legislative power limited to certain fields including agriculture, forestry and fisheries; health; some aspects of primary and secondary education; town planning; internal trade, and so forth.

In introducing these reforms, the French government sought "to give the overseas populations an increased consciousness of their civic responsibilities and enable them to acquire greater experience in the management of public affairs."⁸ It is significant to note that while a measure of internal autonomy was granted on the territorial level, no provision was made for autonomy on the higher level, i.e., for the whole of Equatorial Africa, West Africa and Madagascar respectively. Neither did the notion of complete independence receive any consideration. In fact, the chief architect of the *Loi-Cadre*, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, of the Ivory Coast, who was Minister without Portfolio in the French government in 1956, rejected the idea of independence, saying, "We do not want to abandon this recent (i.e. French) heritage by trying to go back to our origins."⁹

It soon became apparent that Houphouet-Boigny, although still held in esteem as the founder of the powerful *Rassemblement Democratique Africain* (R.D.A.), did not

fully reflect the aspirations of this movement. In September, 1957, at the R.D.A.'s Conference at Bamako (capital of the French Sudan), Houphouet-Boigny was reelected President but his conservative, Francophile tendencies were not endorsed. Instead, the Conference adopted a resolution which, while adhering to the conception of Franco-African interdependence, declared that "all peoples had an inalienable right to independence."¹⁰ Furthermore, at the Bamako Conference dissatisfaction was voiced with the "Balkanization" effect of the *Loi-Cadre* because it allegedly led to "The emergence of a multiplicity of weak African states, which would remain in practice in a 'colonial' relationship to France."¹¹

The Referendum of September, 1958

It is against this background that one must view de Gaulle's new attitude on independence. In 1958, de Gaulle did not favor independence for the colonies any more than he did in 1944. He was now fully conscious of what had happened in the colonial world since 1944, particularly of the great temptation Ghana's independence represented for Africans. He was also aware of the great difficulties France had experienced, notably in Indochina and Algeria, in meeting the challenge of colonial nationalism. Consequently, he could foresee no good coming to France by insistence on the formula of Brazzaville, 1944, that ruled out "any idea of autonomy, any possibility of an evolution outside the French bloc of the Empire."

Offering the peoples of Africa south of the Sahara a choice between independence and a French Community was good psychology. Independence was no longer the forbidden fruit. All that was necessary was to reach out and take it. It is true that in putting the question of independence on the line in a referendum, de Gaulle was taking a gamble. The possibility existed that the independence option would be taken up widely. Still, this was not very likely because of the relative infancy of militant nationalism in the terri-

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁹ Felix Houphouet-Boigny, "Black Africa and the French Union," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 35, No. 4, July 1957, p. 549.

¹⁰ Thomas Hodgkin, "After Bamako," *Africa Special Report*, Vol. 2, No. 11, December, 1957, p. 4.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3. The opposition to Houphouet-Boigny centered about Sekou Toure of Guinea and Leopold-Sedar Senghor of Senegal.

tories, the suddenness with which the question was posed, and the consequences of independence, which were made perfectly clear. De Gaulle had stressed that by refusing to join the French Community a territory would "break every tie" with France. Independence, he pointed out, was a two-way proposition: a territory could choose independence from France, but in doing so she gave France the right to be independent of the territory. Thus, the right of secession was accompanied by a warning that independence would bring a halt in French financial aid, the cutting of economic ties, the withdrawal of French technicians, and so forth. Given these warnings, the leaders of the African territories would reflect carefully before yielding to the temptation of independence.

Moreover, the fact that de Gaulle did not close the door to independence once a territory entered the French Community greatly eased the strain of the dilemma confronting the African leaders. Under these circumstances de Gaulle's gamble was not a huge one. Had all the territories voted "yes" on the referendum, its authenticity would no doubt have been seriously questioned. The fact that one territory, Guinea, rejected the French Community, served to demonstrate de Gaulle's sincerity in offering independence and proved the validity of the vote in black Africa.

What did de Gaulle gain by giving the territories the permanent choice of self-determination? Would not the stability of the new French Community be undermined if it were constantly threatened by secession on the part of its members? Actually, leaving the door open to independence, as de Gaulle did, gave the new French Community the mark of a voluntary association. Furthermore, it gave France time to prove (1) the folly of independence under the exigencies of modern life, and (2) that the only feasible alternative to it was "the rule which is obvious to all clear thinkers, that in a world as it is, it is necessary to establish large economic, political, cultural and defense *ensembles*."¹² That there is something defensive about France's fears of the spread of independence in Africa is undeniable; neither can it be denied that there is a certain validity to the argument on the dangers

of "going it alone." What the new French Community represents, in the eyes of its sponsors, is the opportunity to prove the superiority of joint undertakings.

The de Gaulle policy is so firmly convinced of the advantages of interdependence as contrasted with independence that it is hopeful of winning back those former French dependencies that have achieved full independence. In his first address on becoming Premier in June, 1958, de Gaulle spoke of the need "to establish, on the basis of cooperation, our relations with Morocco, Tunisia and the States of Indochina" among the "huge problems" confronting France.¹³ Article 88 of the new French Constitution embodies this notion in providing for "agreements with States that wish to associate themselves with the Community in order to develop their own civilizations." This article applies to any state, but it is especially intended for (1) the former protectorates in North Africa and Indochina, (2) for Guinea, which took up de Gaulle's challenge and voted for independence, and (3) for the two French Trust Territories of Togoland and the Cameroon, once the United Nations has recognized their independence.

Whether Article 88 will ever be anything more than a pious hope depends in large part on the way in which the French Community develops. It is as yet too early to tell exactly what the new French Community will be like. In it we find units enjoying varying status. There is, first, a basic division between the French Republic and other autonomous member states. The French Republic is made up of (1) *Metropolitan France*, which includes Algeria; (2) the *Overseas Departments* of Reunion, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana; (3) the *Overseas Territories* of French Somaliland, Comoro Islands, St. Pierre and Miquelon, New Caledonia and French Polynesia. The other member states are the following 12 new republics: the Mauritanian Islamic Republic, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, the Voltaic Republic, (all formerly territories of French West Africa), Gabon, Chad, Congo, the Central

¹² Speech at Brazzaville, August 24, 1958, excerpt quoted in *Europe France Outremer*, special issue, "Communaute," No. 347.

¹³ "Premier de Gaulle's Speech to the Nation," *Speeches and Press Conferences* No. 110, Ambassade, etc., June, 1958.

African Republic, (all formerly territories of French Equatorial Africa), and Madagascar.

Following the referendum of September 28, 1958, the various overseas territories were given the opportunity (under Article 91, paragraph 2, of the new Constitution) to choose within six months (1) to remain as *Overseas Territories*, (2) to become *Overseas Departments*, thus becoming more closely integrated with the French Republic, or (3) to become autonomous member states of the Community. The choice was exercised by the respective Territorial Assemblies, which had been elected under the *Loi-Cadre* of 1956.

Among the organs of the French Community, only the Executive Council has met to date. This body consisting of the Premier of France, the heads of government of each of the member states, and the French ministers responsible for the common affairs of the Community has as its role the organization of "cooperation of members of the Community, at government and administrative levels."¹⁴ Still to be organized is the Senate and the Court of Arbitration. The Senate is to be composed of delegates—one for every 300,000 inhabitants or fraction thereof—with a minimum of three seats for each state. On this basis, the Senate will comprise 284 members, with the French Republic (Metropolitan France, Algeria, the Overseas Departments and the Overseas Territories) having 186 seats and the other member states, 98 delegates.

It is quite clear that France occupies a central and dominant position in the Community. To all intents and purposes, it controls foreign affairs, defense, currency, external economic policy and trade relations, as well as policy on strategic raw materials. These powers are denied to the member states and are reserved to the Community as a whole. In a sense, the French Community is an organization "in the federal manner," as General de Gaulle called it, but it is a federation in which one component unit dwarfs all others. The question remains whether such a federation of people of diverse cultural backgrounds, and at different stages of development, can endure. Is the French Community sufficiently flexible to adjust to changing conditions—notably to a demand by the smaller member states for

a greater voice in their own affairs and the affairs of the Community as a whole?

Among the new African republics, now autonomous member states of the French Community, there is strong evidence that their present status will not satisfy them for long. By way of example, the President of the *Conseil de Gouvernement* of the Mauritanian Islamic Republic, Moktar Ould Daddah, has indicated that sooner or later his state will move out of the Community itself toward the type of association provided for in Article 88. While Houphouët-Boigny has indignantly declared that "We entered into the Community in order to remain in it, not to leave it," Ould Daddah's position is also taken by leaders in Senegal and Dahomey.¹⁵

Sekou Touré, who led Guinea in voting "no" in the referendum and became its first President after independence, has predicted that France will soon lose her African territories for the "People will not; for long, follow their leaders who have chosen the past."¹⁶ Touré has hit on the heart of the question of the French Community's future—its acceptance by the peoples of the African territories. In other words, the question is whether it will prove to be a satisfactory answer to nationalism in France's territories in Africa south of the Sahara. Considering the developments in the neighbouring African territories—the Belgian Congo, Nigeria, Nyasaland, Togoland, the Cameroons and Tanganyika, the chances are slight that the French Community, in its present form, will satisfy the steadily mounting pressure of nationalism. What is more likely is the transformation of the French Community from a federation to a weaker confederation or an association of states along the lines of the Commonwealth.

One of the factors mitigating against the success of the French Community is the Algerian War. The longer the rebellion continues the stronger is its disconcerting effect in other parts of Africa and the more difficult it is for France to maintain normal relations with Morocco and Tunisia and perhaps win them back as Associated States. However, the French Community, while it offers a new French approach to colonialism, contributes

¹⁴ Article 82 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic.

¹⁵ André Blanchet, "Conditions et Sens du Vote du 28 Septembre," in *Europe France Outremer* cited above.

¹⁶ *France-Soir*, January 27, 1959.

little to the solution of the Algerian problem because France considers Algeria a part of the Metropole, not a dependency. De Gaulle did not give Algeria the same choice of independence in the September referendum as he gave the other French dependencies. As long as Algeria remains in its present juridical status, the provision of permanent self-determination contained in Article 86 of the Constitution does not apply to it.

Whether de Gaulle would have acknowledged Algeria's right to independence had the referendum gone against the Constitution is difficult to say. Given the situation in Algeria with the French army running the election, one could hardly have expected such a result. It is clear that de Gaulle accepted the outcome of the referendum as "mutually and forever" pledging Algeria and France to each other.¹⁷

Yet, included in all of de Gaulle's utterances on Algeria is evidence that he recognizes that Algeria is *not* France. Despite pressure from the French *colons* in Algeria and from within the very group that paved the way for his return to power, he has resisted adopting as his own their policy of complete "integration" of Algeria into France. Instead, he has spoken of Algeria's "personality and her close solidarity with Metropolitan France," and of giving Algeria's Muslim population new opportunities for a better life.¹⁸ In actual deeds, de Gaulle's Algerian policy departed radically from the *colons'* position when he abolished the two college electoral system, replacing it with a single college.¹⁹

De Gaulle's predecessors as premiers in the last two years of the Fourth Republic sought vainly to modify the two college system, but were unable to do so in face of the diehard opposition of the *colons* and their supporters in the French National Assembly. Not all of de Gaulle's pronouncements on Algeria are as clear in their meaning as was his action on the single college. Concerning the future of Algeria, de Gaulle has used, as he has in other instances, obscure and enigmatic lan-

guage; but he has clearly indicated that he will not be stampeded by extremists—French or Muslim. On October 23, 1958, he invited the leaders of the Algerian rebellion to come to Paris under promise of a safe conduct to discuss a cease-fire, and said:

The political destiny of Algeria is Algeria itself. . . . This way is open in Algeria. The referendum has taken place. In November, the legislative elections will be held; in March, the elections to the municipal councils; in April the election of Senators. What will be the outcome? That is a matter of evolution The future solution will be based—because that is the nature of things—upon the courageous personality of Algeria and upon its close association with Metropolitan France. I believe also that this ensemble, completed by the Sahara, will link itself, for the common progress, with the free States of Morocco and Tunisia.²⁰

It is of course dangerous to speculate on the full and exact meaning of these words. However, it is difficult to avoid certain conclusions from them and the other evidences of de Gaulle's independent thinking on Algeria. It is noteworthy that de Gaulle talks of Algeria's "close association with Metropolitan France" and not of Algeria as *part* of Metropolitan France. Implicit in this notion is the fact that the evolution de Gaulle speaks of could lead to a North African federation in which Algeria would play a role not as part of Metropolitan France but as a separate and distinct entity. De Gaulle speaks of the "free states" of Morocco and Tunisia linking themselves with Algeria and France for common progress. It does not seem unreasonable to expect the Algerian link in this chain to be a free state of Algeria. This seems to be the direction in which de Gaulle's Algerian policy is heading.

De Gaulle is a firm believer in the efficacy of the French Community. Article 88 of the Constitution with its provision for Associated States might offer him the way for such a settlement in North Africa. By loosening its hold on Algeria, France could hope to reestablish firmer ties, on a basis of equality, with Morocco and Tunisia. Once this North African Federation is established, a solution which Moroccan and Tunisian leaders as well as de Gaulle have been advocating, the disconcerting effect of the Algerian situation in the other territories of the French Community will perhaps be removed.

¹⁷ "Premier de Gaulle Outlines His Program for Algeria," *Speeches and Press Conferences*, No. 117, Ambassade de France, etc., October, 1958.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ The two-college system was introduced by the Statute of Algeria in 1947. Under it, some one million Frenchmen voting in the First College carried equal weight with the 9 million Muslims voting in the Second College.

²⁰ "Press Conference of General de Gaulle," No. 119, October, 1958.

Will France be able to stabilize her currency? Describing the "discouraging history" of French economic reform, this specialist notes: "Particularly since the end of World War II, there has been a record of remarkable effort and creditable accomplishment in the area of modernization and re-equipment, repeatedly dragged back by poor financial management: overspending, over-borrowing, poor taxation, inadequate tax collections, and generally incompetent central financing direction."

Austerity and Fifth Republic Finance

By ALZADA COMSTOCK

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GENERAL Charles de Gaulle laid a firm hand on the finances of the Fifth Republic at the end of 1958, in behalf of his program of "truth and austerity" for France. On December 29 the value of the franc was reduced by 14.9 per cent; that is, from 420 francs to the United States dollar to 493.7 francs to the dollar.

The French franc is the perennial sick man among the currencies of Western Europe. Less than 50 years ago it was about five to the dollar. In the course of the misadventures of wars, dissension and financial mishandling, it dropped in a series of jerks to 119 to the dollar after the end of World War II; and so on down to 420 to the dollar before it was again devalued in December, 1958.

It may seem odd to try to bolster an almost valueless currency unit by weakening its value still further. Under General de Gaulle, however, the devaluation was accompanied by a series of financial reforms designed to make the new value stick, and also by plans

for strengthening the whole economy. General de Gaulle is so sure that it can be done that he has promised a new franc before the end of 1959, a "heavy" franc that will be worth 100 of the present francs and will exchange for American money at approximately five to the dollar.

The reduction in the value of the franc was expected to increase French exports by bringing the prices of French products into line with those of her competitors in foreign markets; that is, to cause the dollar and the pound and the mark and the rest to have an increased value in francs and so buy more French goods. Another advantage to the French economy should come from the reverse side: unnecessary imports, now more expensive for the French buyer, should fall off.

Strengthening the Budget

Settling the new value of the franc was only the first step. It was recognized by General de Gaulle and Minister of Finance Antoine Pinet that if the impending price increases led merely to further inflation the game was lost. Further inflation was inevitable unless the scheduled budget deficit of 1,200 billion francs for 1959—twice the amount the country was likely to be able to borrow—was pared down.

Reducing expenditures, they told the country, was not easy. Social expenditures, those for housing, schools, hospitals and the like, must be maintained or increased, and so must many in the economic field, including

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outlays for power, industrial equipment and communications. Money must go into the Algerian economy. A military force must be maintained. The country's normal expenditures must continue.

A few economies were possible and would be made. Many subsidies on food were abolished. The nationalized industries, including the railroads, coal mines, gas and electricity were deprived of their subsidies but were allowed to raise prices. Such steps would materially aid the budget although they would have inflationary effects on prices. In the end the estimated expenditure for 1959 stood at 6,200 billion francs, a figure well above that for 1958.

Fortunately it was possible to budget for increased revenue in 1959. The government felt sure of higher taxable income from higher prices and increased prosperity, but it took the precaution of increasing individual income taxes, corporation income taxes and turnover taxes. In the end the estimated deficit stood at 587 billion francs, an amount slightly less than the deficit of 600 billion in 1958.

Fight Against Rising Prices

The thorniest immediate problem was that of rising prices. If the upward trend could not be controlled the new devaluation must end as disastrously as all the others. According to the government estimate, the increase in the cost of living must be kept under eight per cent if the whole plan were to be effective.

The forces making for rising prices were formidable. The decreased nominal value of the franc was the initial factor. By the latter part of January the nationalized industries, deprived of their subsidies, had raised their prices. Steel was up 8 to 10 per cent, railway charges 10 per cent, gas and electricity 4.5 to 6.5 per cent, cigarettes and tobacco 15 to 20 per cent; and meat (obeying a seasonal rather than a budgetary trend) was dearer.

From the beginning the government realized that it must guard the well-being of the poorest even while it took all possible steps to hold prices steady. The small number of workers on the minimum wage got a 4.5 per cent increase and public employees were given a 4 per cent raise.

Old age pensioners were given small increases.

The most important stabilizing step was the abolition of "indexing wages." This was the cancellation of the escalator clauses in collective labor contracts covering workers earning more than the minimum. Under the escalator clauses wages rose with the official cost-of-living index. It was a foregone conclusion that many of the workers would believe that their class was bearing the brunt of the austerity program. Socialist Ministers Mollet and Thomas resigned immediately after the December decisions.

"These are harsh measures," said General de Gaulle in a broadcast to the people on December 28, 1958, "but I consider them necessary, and I am sure that in the long run everyone will benefit from the stability thus achieved." He continued:

If this effort to put things in order again is not made with the sacrifices it requires and the hopes it engenders, we shall remain a country in tow, swinging perpetually between tragedy and mediocrity. If, on the contrary, we succeed in two, swinging perpetually between tragedy and economic recovery, what a step that will be along the road that will lead us to the top.

Money and the Economy

A livelier and better-balanced foreign trade was one of the requirements of the plan for rebuilding the French economy. The two important steps taken in this direction were non-resident convertibility, which was apparently the result of a recent decision, and active participation in the long-planned European Economic Community, or Common Market.

One of the announcements of the memorable final weekend of December, 1958, was that France, acting concurrently with nine other countries of Western Europe, including the United Kingdom, would permit its currency to be converted by non-residents, not only into the currencies of the other countries involved, but also into United States dollars. This reflected a considerable recent improvement in the economic situation of France, which had felt the 1958 recession less deeply than some of its neighbors and had been able to strengthen its monetary reserves sufficiently to take such a step.

France and the Common Market

France hopes to gain political as well as economic reinforcement from the operations of the six-nation Common Market which began its active existence on January 1, 1959. The Common Market has been long in the making, with France always a politically and economically important force, usually a promoting agent, and sometimes an individualistic and difficult associate. The ancestry of the Common Market may be traced to Benelux, the customs union of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg adopted January 1, 1948, and to the European Coal and Steel Community suggested by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman May 9, 1950, and in operation for the six participating countries (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) since 1953.

"The Six" began committee work on a common market in 1955. Plans for a customs union (European Economic Community) and an atomic community (Euratom) were completed in 1956. The two communities were authorized by the Treaties of Rome on March 25, 1957; and on January 1, 1958, the new institutions were set up. The definite commercial concessions required for the Common Market were worked out in the course of 1958, in preparation for actual operation at the beginning of 1959.

At first the details of the long discussions made few headlines. But Britain had been working since 1956 on a complementary free trade area which would give the other 11 countries of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.) and particularly the "other six" most interested (Britain, Austria, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries) some of the coming advantages of lowered trade barriers. Britain was finding France the hardest country to deal with. As the strain between the two countries became more severe in the latter part of 1958 their differences became front-page news.

For France and the other five countries the advantages of the Common Market loom large at the present time. The treaty provides that the six countries, with their 165 million people, are to abolish gradually all

tariffs, import quotas and other trade barriers among themselves, and that they will have a uniform tariff for the goods of the rest of the world. This means that high-tariff France, like Italy, must lower its rates; that West Germany need make little change; and that the low-tariff countries, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, will raise their tariffs against goods coming from outside the customs union.

Britain's proposal of a Free Trade Area to which some of the Common Market concessions would be extended was a logical one, in view of the intricacies of European trade. Quotas for imported goods were raised by the Common Market on January 1, 1959. Before that time Britain moved to have the enlarged quotas for members' goods extended to all countries of the proposed Free Trade Area. About one-third of British industrial exports to France are subject to quota. The new schedule meant that permitted imports of Common Market cars into France would be multiplied by three, while French imports of British cars must remain close to their earlier level.

France refused the quota proposal, as had seemed probable since the French case against the Free Trade Area was expressed in a Memorandum to the other members of the Common Market in March, 1958. French attitudes on specific points connected with the Free Trade Area fluctuated through the somewhat embittered discussion with Britain in the next few months. Early in November the French Government said bluntly that it would go no further, and on November 15 the British broke off all talks on the subject. Britain was convinced that France was opposing some of the other members of the Common Market in its high protectionism.

France has somehow managed to reconcile, to its own satisfaction but to the bewilderment of bystanders, its high protectionism and its deep-seated desire for friendship and a common front with Germany. Apparently trade barriers can be sacrificed in behalf of Franco-German amity but not for other causes. The trade-minded British were slow to absorb this idea. In fact, the differences in the intellectual habits of the British and the French have been well illustrated in the weeks following the failure

of the Free Trade Area talks. The British accused themselves of concentrating too simply on commercial issues and of ignoring the political issues—of being, in short, a “nation of shopkeepers.” The French accused the British of plotting against Franco-German friendship and European union, and even—if French cartoons may be taken at face value—of conniving with Russia to ruin the Common Market.

Lessons from the Past

France’s discouraging history contains lessons for the present program, if only the people who most need to learn them can be reached. Particularly since the end of World War II, there has been a record of remarkable effort and creditable accomplishment in the area of modernization and re-equipment, repeatedly dragged back by poor financial management: over-spending, over-borrowing, poor taxation, inadequate tax collections, and generally incompetent central financial direction.

The Monnet Plan of 1946, named after Jean Monnet, its distinguished author, was a guide to the rehabilitation of the French economy and the direction of state assistance. Inflation continued and the French economy lost ground. In the first two years after the end of the war France was nationalizing basic industries (coal, gas, oil, electricity, chemicals and several others, up to about 20 per cent of the country’s industrial activity) for reasons that were political rather than economic. In those industries costs and benefits rose. The French people in general had no taste for the austerity practised by the British after the war. They were tired of hardships, and they demanded goods and services from their government. Various classes, particularly the farmers, devised their own ways of anticipating and profiting by the spiraling inflation. Budget deficits were the rule, and the state borrowed and printed to make up the difference.

Marshall Plan payments to France helped to modernize industry and agriculture but they had little effect on fiscal management. By 1949 a conservative trend among the governments which succeeded one another rapidly had checked inflation. At this point fate was against France. The Korean effort of 1950 required many raw materials and

French prices were pushed up by American stockpiling. Public expenditures rose from 2,422 billion francs in 1950 to 3,720 billion in 1953. Again the sequence was: spend, borrow, print.

Reforms

Premier Antoine Pinay (to become Minister of Finance under President de Gaulle in 1959) seemed to have the franc under control for a few weeks in 1952, but that effort failed, together with plans for a balanced budget. The story has a depressing monotony. In 1954, another strong man, Pierre Mendès-France, rose to become Premier and to plan for the following:

1. Economic expansion and increase in the national income.
2. Normalization and reduction of production costs; reduction of expenditures.
3. Reduction of prices and increase in purchasing power.
4. Increase in foreign trade and improvement in the balance of payments.
5. Economic improvement in the overseas territories.

The prospects of orthodox financing and a balanced budget did not suit the entrenched interests of France in 1954 any more than they do today. The opposition was determined to “get” Mendès-France, and get him they did; first by refusing to meet his budgetary requirements and then on issues of North African policy. Early in February, 1955, the Mendès-France government fell.

Just as the hopes and plans of Mendès-France and President de Gaulle resemble one another too closely for comfort, so do the emergencies they were devised to meet. In General de Gaulle’s broadcast to the French nation on December 28, 1958, the dangers just past were described as follows:

In the last days of May [1958] we were . . . headed toward disaster. The balance of payments between what we had to buy abroad and what we could sell there was reaching an apparently irreducible deficit, while foreign loans were almost exhausted. Moreover, we could not see how to meet all the expenses of the State in a normal manner, taxes being inadequate for that purpose and credit seeming on the point of

vanishing. Finally, prices were continuing to rise and also social unrest. To cap the climax, a certain degree of recession was already making itself felt.

General de Gaulle went on to outline the measures which would "place the nation on a foundation of truth and austerity": the cut in the budget deficit to avoid "resorting to a ruinous inflation or failing France"; the increased taxes, cancelled subsidies, abolished escalator clauses and pensions to able-bodied veterans, and all the rest; ending with the promise of the "heavy" French franc by the end of 1959, because "we want the old French franc—so often mutilated in proportion to our vicissitudes—to have a substance commensurate with the respect that is its due."

What Will the Harvest Be?

It is far too early to evaluate the results of the reforms begun in December, 1958. France's record is against her. Reform after reform has foundered on the same reefs. Low income groups, already depressed by the 1958 depression, honestly feel that they are the scapegoats. The prospect of smaller incomes (with escalator clauses abolished) and a higher cost of living (with food subsidies gone) has already caused grumbling,

particularly in the industrial north. War veterans who were not crippled resent the loss of their tiny pensions.

Inevitably there have been scandals. It seems that news of the coming devaluation leaked out in December and those in the know made huge profits. Raising quotas under the rules of the Common Market has offended many of the entrenched—and many of the inefficient—home producers. Mendès-France is undoubtedly remembering those pressures as he felt them in 1954. Successive devaluations have not been able to save France. Three modernization plans in succession have not been able to save France.

There are at the same time some hopeful signs. Domestic prices rose in the first weeks, but failed to skyrocket. The index of industrial production rose. In January the Bank of France more than regained the losses in reserves it suffered in December, 1958.

The best sign of all is an intangible. President de Gaulle has shown a unique ability to feel the temper of his people and at the same time to run the business of a nation. If he can sustain these qualities and also surround himself with men who share them in some measure, France may be able to arrest the long slide towards financial disintegration. It is probably her last chance.

(Continued from page 266)

rooted in the past. It is the recurrent task of the historian to make this past meaningful in terms of an ever-changing present. The mission of historian and statesman alike has become far more complex in a world of repeated and revolutionary change. The French in particular have been obliged to occupy no fewer than three worlds in the memory of men now in middle life: "*la belle époque*," before 1914, when the problems of the Western world were still masked in clichés like "progress" and when it was naïvely assumed that the nineteenth century had come to stay; the inter-war years, when the disillusionments of the war past were presently reinforced by the disillusionments of the war

approaching and when the problems seemed so vast and insoluble that the French, like others, turned only too often from reason to incantation and from fortitude to surrender; and finally, the post-liberation years when, with the primacy of Europe yielding to the new colossi, France has been forced to harken to the ominous dialogue of East and West. That she has been able to absorb these psychic shocks and yet to respond to the challenge of this newest age with such achievements as her leadership in the creation of a new Europe and the significant upswing in the past years of her much criticized economy are evidences of the dynamism and adaptability of this altogether remarkable people—about whose positive qualities this article has said far too little.

Although de Gaulle at last "... recognizes that 'grandeur' without the economic underpinnings and without national economic solvency is no grandeur at all," this specialist believes that "... his sense of economic realities deserts him when he calls for atomic weapons for France." Despite progress under the Fourth Republic, "French unions are weak in structure, in dues payments, in strike funds and in discipline." And there is still considerable "pessimism about management's ability to manage ..."

Labor and Management under De Gaulle

BY VAL R. LORWIN

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THE WORDS "labor" and "industry" coupled in a title look natural enough to Americans, because it is within the same world of beliefs and purposes that management and unions operate—and on occasion battle. To French readers, the title would seem odd or forced. Management and labor in France inherit the hostilities and misunderstandings of generations of political and social conflict. Management naturally fears labor's radicalism, and it has not learned how to encourage constructive unionism with a share in plant-level decisions on labor's concerns. Workers are painfully aware of social as well as economic inferiority. The unions reject capitalism, and they do not trust employers to "deliver the goods" in the form of continually improved standards of living. They resent the authoritarian managerial concepts of many heads of

industry, and they suspect a recourse to paternalism as an alternative to collective bargaining. As a matter of fact, almost all the improvements in the history of French labor relations have come not by contract but by government action.

French industry is in many ways unlike American industry, but the unions are even more unlike American unions. The unions are weak, despite a long tradition of class-consciousness and radicalism; they are sharply divided; and they play only a minor role in industrial relations at the plant level.

The union mosaic reflects basic cleavages in French society. The Communists have since the war dominated the oldest and largest of the workers' organizations, the General Confederation of Labor, or C.G.T. (Confédération Générale du Travail). The Socialists are strongest in the Workers' Force, or F.O. (Force Ouvrière). As in many Continental countries, there is also a Catholic group: the French Confederation of Catholic Workers, or C.F.T.C. (Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens). A fourth organization, the General Confederation of Supervisory Employees, or C.G.C. (Confédération Générale des Cadres), is the leading union among foremen, technicians, traveling salesmen and supervisory staff.

The Communists used their control of the C.G.T. and exploited the legitimate grievances of the workers in the difficult period of reconstruction, to fight the Marshall Plan by

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a general strike of almost insurrectionary character in 1947. The energetic action of the government and the opposition of the non-Communist unions to the strike saved France from the possibility of the fate of Czechoslovakia. Despite the continued loss of membership which has resulted from the Communists' political manipulation of the C.G.T., it remains the strongest of the confederations. F.O. has never been able to climb above its initial membership, although its very existence is a rebuke to the leaders of the C.G.T. The Catholic unions have been growing solidly but slowly; they are a remote second in strength to the C.G.T., for anticlericalism has always been a strong tradition among French workers. Most workers, however, do not belong to any union. And the unions have no compulsive devices such as the closed shop or union security clauses by which to bind members.

French unions are weak in structure, in dues payments, in strike funds and in discipline. General de Gaulle a year ago privately received a C.F.T.C. group. When he asked them how many members they had, an embarrassed pause ensued. It is not good form, or good sense, to ask for membership figures in France, where union membership is a loose and vague concept. No figures of "dues-paying membership" are available, nor would they be meaningful.

Yet unions count, and the balance of union influence may be a political determinant, and sometimes an economic fact of importance. In a modern democratic society, public authorities and employers cannot afford to do without some representation of workers' opinions and interests. And the unions of those who are organized must, even if imperfectly, represent labor on many of the economic and social organizations of national life.

Post-war legislation gave a large place to the recognized representatives of organized labor. This recognition has lasted into a period whose spirit is utterly different. No freely elected government lightly takes the risks of revoking the legislative gains of labor.

In spite of the weakness of the unions, some forward-looking managers in both the government-owned sector and in private industry have been trying to overcome the

long heritage of class hostility on both sides. They have found a number of representatives of the non-Communist unions (C.F.T.C., F.O., and the C.G.C.) willing to meet them half way. Even some of the local C.G.T. leaders have disregarded their national union line in order to get something for their followers at the plant level.

Collective Bargaining

In the public sector, the pace setter in collective bargaining has been the highly successful Renault automobile concern. In private industry, a courageous lead came from the national association of the textile industry, despite its precarious position in the world-wide textile crisis. The National Council of French Employers (the C.N.P.F.) privately frowned on the textile employers' willingness to go as far as it has in dealing with the unions. But at the very close of 1958, the C.N.P.F. negotiated a significant agreement with the non-Communist unions for supplemental unemployment benefits to eke out the scanty amounts and partial coverage of government payments to the jobless.

Bargaining alone cannot bridge the gap between management and labor. Partly this gap is caused by deep social and political conflicts outside the plant itself. But partly it is the consequence of labor's pessimism about management's ability to manage, a pessimism long shared by many on the industry side itself.

"What the workers expect of their employers," said the heads of four employers' associations a few years ago, "is first of all that they fulfill their role of employers, and fulfill it effectively. If we do not disappoint them in this, we shall begin to give them hope again." And that is what in the 1950's French management, by and large, had begun to do.

Post-war reconstruction in France had been rapid. By 1949, with American aid, French industry and labor had brought the economy back to immediate pre-war levels. But it was more than wartime stagnation and destruction that had to be made up for if, as the Monnet Planning Commission said, France was to "turn its back on decadence." The nation also had to make up for generations of slow progress when France had been

passed in economic development not only by Germany and the United States but by half a dozen smaller European countries.

For over half a century, many branches of industry and most of agriculture had succeeded in escaping uncomfortable competition, snoozing behind tariff and quota walls, in the shade of government subsidies and cartel-administered markets. Inventors were clever and labor worked hard. But most of industry tended to produce unstandardized goods in small volume, at high profits per unit of output, for favored class markets, neglecting potential mass markets.

An Industrial "Miracle"

In the 1950's, France experienced its best sustained period of economic advance for nearly a century. Steel modernized and expanded. Coal production recovered better than in any other European nation. The railroads (government-owned, like most of those in Europe) were modernized and electrified; they are now as efficient as any anywhere. Electricity and gas production zoomed. So did that of chemical plants, oil refineries, electrometallurgy and electrochemicals, automobiles and agricultural machinery, as well as household durable goods. In the years between 1952 and 1958, industrial production as a whole increased more than 50 per cent; in the decade just ended, it doubled. This was a rate of advance comparable with the West German "miracle," and faster than that of the United States or Britain during the period. (Of course the French had more lost time to make up for than we did, not to speak of the devastation and bloodletting of two wars.) This economic advance is one of the greatest assets inherited by the Fifth Republic. It was rather overlooked by most Frenchmen and by most foreign observers in the concentration on rising prices and falling cabinets during these years.

The doctrine may be startled to see how little influence poor labor relations and the lack of social consensus had on output. Good human relations and good industrial relations (the two are not exactly the same) are important values in themselves. But even without them it may be possible to have high output. This was the case in France during the 1950's.

The increase in washing machines and refrigerators, radios and television sets, scooters and automobiles, began to make a vivid change in the style of life of many Frenchmen and French women, and notably in that of the working classes. (As usual, ever since Ernest Renan in the 1870's, some of the most thoughtful and some of the least thoughtful Frenchmen began to lament the "Americanization" of French living.) But there has not yet been time for this changing way of life to be reflected in political attitudes or industrial relations.

Two great weaknesses—distribution and construction—marred the economic upsurge, and both remain to plague the Fifth Republic. The appalling inefficiency of retailing has been the heaviest single drag on the French economy. The squeeze on some of the overprotected small retailers was the source of the fantastic political phenomenon of Poujadism, which has been dissipated as a party but not as a state of mind.

In housing, France has a whole generation's lag to make up for, since excessively rigid rent controls (as well as the depression) stifled new building after 1930. After the war, France rebuilt more slowly and at higher cost than most other Western European countries—not only West Germany and The Netherlands, Sweden and Britain, but even Italy. Meanwhile the birth rate, after a century's slow pulse, suddenly rose and has remained high since the war's end. This is one of the most lively manifestations of a great people's vitality. But overcrowding and antiquated housing menace health and family life for hundreds of thousands of new families and old. They are a constant reminder of social injustice, as well as a barrier to the mobility of labor and the efficient location of industry.

European Integration

French industry joined in the European Coal and Steel Community (the Schuman Plan): a common market, free of tariff or price discrimination, for the coal, iron and steel of the Benelux nations, Italy, West Germany and France. Despite the fears which caused some powerful industrialists and trade associations to oppose ratification of the Schuman Plan, French industries have stood the test of the new competition so far.

The Fifth Republic inherits the broader experiment of the European Common Market. In it, step by treaty-specified step, the six countries of the Schuman Plan are establishing free movement of goods, capital and people across the frontiers of their "little Europe."

De Gaulle, despite his distrust of European integration, has honored his predecessors' commitment to the Common Market. And, after some hesitation, he has kept the French promise to eliminate many of the quotas on imports from the other countries of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

Progressive firms and the progressive branches of industry have welcomed the new measures as opening new markets abroad to them. In less modern and less enterprising sectors of industry, however, both management and labor see only the dangers from such winds of international competition as have never before been allowed to blow through France. They have worked to get escape clauses, subsidies and other open or disguised forms of protection. Labor, for all its internationalist resolutions, has objected to the immigration of Italian workers, even though there has been hardly any unemployment in France since the war.

"Verity and Severity"

The Fifth Republic was ushered in by a series of economic, financial and social measures taken by De Gaulle under his decree powers as premier. "Verity and severity" was the government's description of its Christmastide news for Frenchmen.

The *verity* was that the nation had been living for years beyond its means, and that it now must cease looking for any more hand-outs from its friends abroad, and must trim its style of living to pay the cost of national policies.

The *severity* fell largely on the mass of low-income families. In a country whose tax system is weak and dependent on indirect taxes, an austerity program almost inevitably demands most sacrifices from those of modest means. But it is a bad start for the new Republic, for it sharpens the old feelings of injustice among the workers.

The government abolished its subsidies on many cost-of-living items: bread, milk, rail

fares, gas and electricity, among others; and it raised excise taxes on cigarettes and tobacco products and other items. Rents went up. Social security benefits were cut; some of the measures looked like callous penny-pinching, such as a slash in allowances to expectant mothers in the last three months of pregnancy.

The government is holding back on much of the wage increases promised its own employees, and is discouraging wage increases in private employment. It has not altered the automatic cost-of-living adjustment in the national minimum wage (which is now 32 cents an hour), but it annulled the clauses for automatic cost-of-living adjustments in collective agreements. Such clauses might have an inflationary bias, but the government thus whittled down the meager content of voluntary collective bargaining.

At the same time, the government devalued the franc, to bring French prices in line with those of its Common Market partners, and made the franc partially convertible into hard currencies. Like Poincaré in the 1920's, De Gaulle—a greater man in more troubled times—was appealing for "confidence." Such an appeal was chiefly to the confidence of property owners and investors.

Price stability and confidence are expected to bring out of hiding some of the vast hoards of gold and dollars. Frenchmen of greater prudence than patriotism have tucked away—in mattresses or abroad—amounts said to run to \$10 billion. If enough of this money finds its way into the French capital market, the government may safely reduce the rate of its investments, which since the war have rebuilt and expanded the nation's basic industries and utilities—beginning with the government-owned coal mines, rail and air transport, electric power and gas. Should private investment lag, however, the government's efforts to balance the budget will deepen a slight but worrisome recession which set in last autumn.

The government faces the contradictory dangers of inflation and recession. Either could wash out its economic program and its political hopes. Failure to hold the line on prices would nullify the gains of devaluation and the appeal to confidence, and embroil private employers and the government (itself by far the nation's largest employer) in

strife with democratic and Communist unions both. On the other hand, if the recession should deepen, it would be hard to call, and harder for the unions to win, strikes; but even patches of unemployment would alarm French workers. Either wage-price distortions or increased joblessness would place a premium on Communist and C.G.T. agitation. The Communists have just demonstrated in the municipal elections that they have not lost their following—when they do not have to compete with De Gaulle in person.

Gaullist Labor Policy?

General De Gaulle no longer utters the vague phrases about “association” of capital and labor and the “abolition of the class struggle” which ten years ago sounded to many worried labor people like the echoes of Vichy corporatism. But many workers fear, if not De Gaulle himself, then some of the people around him. This despite the fact that the new régime has issued some forward-looking measures to encourage collective bargaining in the interest of sharing productivity gains, and that it has generalized the C.N.P.F.-union agreement on supplemental unemployment insurance benefits.

The old Gaullist party, the R.P.F., tried and failed to create an auxiliary labor movement; its unions were weak and they split hopelessly apart. The new Gaullist party has not yet taken a position on labor unions. Some of its leaders would like to develop a

satellite union movement of their own. Others would go even farther and set up a single corporatist labor movement (although attempts to do this in Algeria after May 13, 1958, failed). Still others wish to leave well enough alone, with their sympathizers scattered among the existing labor organizations.

De Gaulle now has a much more realistic and interested view of economic matters than he showed as head of the government during and just after the war. He recognizes that “grandeur” without the economic underpinnings and without national economic solvency is no grandeur at all. But his sense of economic realities deserts him when he calls for atomic weapons for France. For, along with the vast economic aid he has promised Algeria and the Black African republics of the French Community, France is fighting a war in Algeria which takes out of the nation's resources half a million soldiers and over \$1 billion a year. The President is the one man who can now save France from that war. But at the moment there is little sign of the war's ending. And De Gaulle's “verity” did not tell the people how much of the overdue financial bill he presented was for the war and for nuclear armaments.

Even without those claims, the load would be heavy on management and on labor. And for them, as for the whole nation, the crucial economic issues come back to the non-economic: colonial politics and war and the international figure which France means to cut.

“What can be said of the role of the Common Man, in the governments of our age? A chief feature of our century is the general acceptance of popular governments—the governments which he controls. This is not to say that authoritarian governments have been generally supplanted by democratic ones. On the contrary, many of the newer democracies have succumbed to commissars and colonels. Nor should we forget that Germany and Italy, not long ago, abandoned their parliaments and followed Hitler and Mussolini to their mutual destruction. Nevertheless, democratic government has retained such prestige that even the most ruthless dictators now profess to be ruling only until government by the Demos can be established or restored.”

“What are the prerequisites for the successful operation of popular governments? First of all, there must be a general willingness to accept the decisions of the majority. This acceptance will be given, however, only if majority power is exercised with restraint, and the minority may hope that their opinion will ultimately prevail.”

—Glenn E. Hoover, Professor Emeritus, Mills College, *The Century of the Common Man*, an address delivered December 9, 1958.

Current Documents

THE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT

Off the coast of Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean, the island of Cyprus was part of the Ottoman Empire until 1878, when it became a British Crown Colony and an increasingly important British military base. Once Greece became independent, the predominantly Greek population in Cyprus longed for *enosis*, union with Greece, and urged self-determination for the island. With Britain and Turkey opposed, friction was intense as early as 1934, and the problem defied solution.

Early in 1957, Turkey indicated that she would accept partition for the island; the British favored a "tridominium"; neither of these plans found favor with the Greek Cypriote majority and continuing unrest endangered the Nato military alliance and the peace of the Mediterranean. Finally, on February 11, 1959, a joint communiqué from Zurich confirmed that at long last a conference of the Greek and Turkish premiers had resulted in agreement on an independent Republic of Cyprus. Details were worked out in a subsequent conference in London with the British Foreign Minister. The complete texts of the Joint Communiqué of February 11 and of the British White Paper of February 19 confirming the arrangements for Cyprus follow:

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON CYPRUS, FEBRUARY 11, 1959

The Premiers of Greece and Turkey, Mr. Karamanlis and Mr. Menderes, assisted by their Foreign Ministers, Mr. Zorlu and Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, met in Zurich from February 5 to 11, 1959.

During their talks, which were held in an atmosphere of sincere cordiality, they examined Greek-Turkish relations, whose evolution in the course of recent years has been the cause of common concern.

Having found a mutual desire to bring their countries back to the road of close collaboration and constructive friendship, enunciated by the two great statesmen Ataturk and Venizelos, the two Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey have expressed their determination to work in common to serve this important cause.

Confident of having taken a decisive step along this road, the two Premiers expressed the certainty that such a happy evolution would reveal itself immediately in all the important sectors of Greek-Turkish relations.

The question of Cyprus was discussed at length in a spirit of mutual understanding.

A compromise agreement was finally reached in spite of considerable difficulties

which this problem presents.

The cause of the unity and welfare of Cyprus emerges victorious.

The moment has come to inform the British Government of the results of the Greek-Turkish talks, which constitute the continuation of tripartite contacts inaugurated during the meetings of the three Foreign Ministers in Paris in December, 1958.

Greece and Turkey, friends and allies of the United Kingdom, do not hesitate to believe that an agreement between the three interested countries will lead to a final solution of the Cyprus question.

Considering that the progress achieved in the course of the Zurich conference opens sufficiently the way for such a solution, the Turkish and Greek Governments propose to reach an understanding with the Government of the United Kingdom in order to continue tripartite negotiations with a view to a happy conclusion.

For this purpose the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece will go to London today to communicate to their British colleague the results of the talks which have just been concluded here.

BRITISH WHITE PAPER ON CYPRUS CONFERENCE

I. MEMORANDUM SETTING OUT THE AGREED FOUNDATION FOR THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Greece and the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic,

Taking note of the declaration by the representative of the Greek Cypriote community and the representative of the Turkish Cypriote community that they accept the documents annexed to this memorandum as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus,

Hereby adopt, on behalf of their respective Governments, the documents annexed to this memorandum and listed below, as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

HAROLD MACMILLAN.

On behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Greece.

K. KARAMANLIS.

On behalf of the Government of the Turkish Republic.

A. MENDERES.

London, Feb. 19, 1959.

II. GREEK-TURKISH ZURICH ACCORD

A. Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus

1. The State of Cyprus shall be a republic, with a Presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice President Turkish, elected by universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities of the island respectively.

2. The official languages of the Republic of Cyprus shall be Greek and Turkish. Legislative and administrative instruments and documents shall be drawn up and promulgated in the two official languages.

3. The Republic of Cyprus shall have its own flag of neutral design and color, chosen

jointly by the President and the Vice President of the Republic.

Authorities and communities shall have the right to fly the Greek and Turkish flags on holidays at the same time as the flag of Cyprus.

The Greek and Turkish communities shall have the right to celebrate Greek and Turkish national holidays.

4. The President and the Vice President shall be elected for a period of five years.

In the event of absence, impediment or vacancy of their posts, the President and the Vice President shall be replaced by the President and the Vice President of the House of Representatives respectively.

In the event of a vacancy in either post, the election of new incumbents shall take place within a period of not more than forty-five days.

The President and the Vice President shall be invested by the House of Representatives, before which they shall take an oath of loyalty and respect for the Constitution. For this purpose, the House of Representatives shall meet within twenty-four hours after its constitution.

5. Executive authority shall be vested in the President and the Vice President. For this purpose, they shall have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek ministers and three Turkish ministers. The ministers shall be designated respectively by the President and the Vice President, who shall appoint them by an instrument signed by them both.

The ministers may be chosen from outside the House of Representatives.

Decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by an absolute majority.

Decisions so taken shall be promulgated immediately by the President and the Vice President by publication in the official gazette.

However, the President and the Vice President shall have the right of final veto and the right to return the decisions of the Council of Ministers under the same conditions as those laid down for laws and decisions of the House of Representatives.

6. Legislative authority shall be vested in a House of Representatives elected for a

period of five years by universal suffrage of each community separately in the proportion of 70 per cent for the Greek community and 30 per cent for the Turkish community, this proportion being fixed independently of statistical data. (N. B. The number of representatives shall be fixed by mutual agreement between the communities.)

The House of Representatives shall exercise authority in all matters other than those expressly reserved to the communal chambers. In the event of a conflict of authority, such conflict shall be decided by the Supreme Constitutional Court, which shall be composed of one Greek, one Turk and one neutral, appointed jointly by the President and the Vice President. The neutral judge shall be president of the court.

7. Laws and decisions of the House of Representatives shall be adopted by a simple majority of the members present. They shall be promulgated within fifteen days if neither the President nor the Vice President returns them for reconsideration as provided in Point 9 below.

The constitutional law, with the exception of its basic articles, may be modified by a majority comprising two-thirds of the Greek members and two-thirds of the Turkish members of the House of Representatives.

Any modification of the electoral law and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities and of any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representatives taking part in the vote and considered separately.

On the adoption of the budget, the President and the Vice President may exercise their right to return it to the House of Representatives if, in their judgment, any question of discrimination arises. If the House maintains its decisions, the President and the Vice President shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme Constitutional Court.

8. The President and the Vice President, separately and conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organizations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate, or concerning defense and security as defined in Annex I.

9. The President and the Vice President of the Republic shall have, separately and conjointly, the right to return all laws and decisions, which may be returned to the House of Representatives within a period of not more than fifteen days for reconsideration.

The House of Representatives shall pronounce within fifteen days on any matter so returned. If the House of Representatives maintains its decisions, the President and the Vice President shall promulgate the law or decision in question within the time limits fixed for the promulgation of laws and decisions.

Laws and decisions which are considered by the President or the Vice President to discriminate against either of the two communities shall be submitted to the Supreme Constitutional Court, which may annul or confirm the law or decision or return it to the House of Representatives for reconsideration, in whole or in part. The law or decision shall not become effective until the Supreme Constitutional Court, or, where it has been returned, the House of Representatives has taken a decision on it.

10. Each community shall have its communal chamber composed of a number of Representatives which it shall itself determine.

The communal chambers shall have the right to impose taxes and levies on members of their community to provide for their needs and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their supervision.

The communal chamber shall exercise authority in all religious, educational, cultural and teaching questions and questions of personal status.

They shall exercise authority in questions where the interests and institutions are of a purely communal nature, such as sporting and charitable foundations, bodies and associations, producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments, created for the purpose of promoting the welfare of one of the communities. (N. B. It is understood that the provisions of the present paragraph cannot be interpreted in such a way as to prevent the creation of mixed and communal institutions where the inhabitants desire them.)

These producers' and consumers' coopera-

tives and credit establishments, which shall be administered under the laws of the Republic, shall be subject to the supervision of the communal chambers. The communal chambers shall also exercise authority in matters initiated by municipalities which are composed of one community only. These municipalities, to which the laws of the Republic shall apply, shall be supervised in their functions by the communal chambers.

Where the central administration is obliged to take over the supervision of the institutions, establishments or municipalities mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs by virtue of legislation in force, this supervision shall be exercised by officials belonging to the same community as the institution, establishment or municipality in question.

11. The civil service shall be composed as to 70 per cent of Greeks and as to 30 per cent of Turks.

It is understood that this quantitative division will be applied as far as practicable in all grades of the civil service.

In regions or localities where one of the two communities is in a majority approaching 100 per cent, the organs of the local administration responsible to the central administration shall be composed solely of officials belonging to that community.

12. The deputies of the Attorney General of the Republic, the Inspector General, the Treasurer and the governor of the issuing bank may not belong to the same community as their principals. The holders of these posts shall be appointed by the President and the Vice President of the Republic acting in agreement.

13. The heads and deputy heads of the armed forces, the gendarmerie and the police shall be appointed by the President and the Vice President of the Republic acting in agreement. One of these heads shall be Turkish, and where the head belongs to one of the communities, the deputy head shall belong to the other.

14. Compulsory military service may only be instituted with the agreement of the President and the Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus.

Cyprus shall have an army of 2,000 men, of whom 60 per cent shall be Greek and 40 per cent Turkish.

The security forces (gendarmerie and

police) shall have a complement of 2,000 men, which may be reduced or increased with the agreement of both the President and the Vice President. The security forces shall be composed as to 70 per cent of Greeks and as to 30 per cent of Turks. However, for an initial period this percentage may be raised to a maximum of 40 per cent of Turks (and consequently reduced to 60 per cent of Greeks) in order not to discharge those Turks now serving in the police, apart from the auxiliary police.

15. Forces which are stationed in part of the territory of the republic inhabited in a proportion approaching 100 per cent by members of a single community shall belong to that community.

16. A High Court of Justice shall be established, which shall consist of two Greeks, one Turk and one neutral, nominated jointly by the President and the Vice President of the Republic.

The president of the court shall be the neutral judge, who shall have two votes.

This court shall constitute the highest organ of the judicature (appointments, promotions of judges, etc.).

17. Civil disputes where the plaintiff and the defendant belong to the same community shall be tried by a tribunal composed of judges belonging to that community. If the plaintiff and defendant belong to different communities, the composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of Justice.

Tribunals dealing with civil disputes relating to questions of personal status and to religious matters, which are reserved to the competence of the communal chambers under Point 10, shall be composed solely of judges belonging to the community concerned. The composition and status of these tribunals shall be determined according to the law drawn up by the communal chamber, and they shall apply the law drawn up by the communal chamber.

In criminal cases, the tribunal shall consist of judges belonging to the same community as the accused. If the injured party belongs to another community, the composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of Justice.

18. The President and the Vice President of the Republic shall each have the right to

exercise the prerogative of mercy to persons from their respective communities who are condemned to death. In cases where the plaintiffs and the convicted persons are members of different communities the prerogative of mercy shall be exercised by agreement between the President and the Vice President. In the event of disagreement the vote for clemency shall prevail. When mercy is accorded the death penalty shall be commuted to life imprisonment.

19. In the event of agricultural reform, lands shall be redistributed only to persons who are members of the same community as the expropriated owners.

Expropriations by the state or the municipalities shall only be carried out on payment of a just and equitable indemnity, fixed, in disputed cases, by the tribunals. An appeal to the tribunals shall have the effect of suspending action.

Expropriated property shall only be used for the purpose for which the expropriation was made. Otherwise the property shall be restored to the owners.

20. Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of Cyprus by the Turkish inhabitants of these towns. However:

(A) In each of the towns a coordinating body shall be set up which shall supervise work which needs to be carried out jointly and shall concern itself with matters which require a degree of cooperation. These bodies shall each be composed of two members chosen by the Greek municipalities, two members chosen by the Turkish municipalities and a president chosen by agreement between the two municipalities.

(B) The President and the Vice President shall examine within four years the question whether or not this separation of municipalities in the five largest towns shall continue.

With regard to other localities, special arrangements shall be made for the constitution of municipal bodies, following, as far as possible, the rule of proportional representation for the two communities.

21. A treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and constitution of the new state of Cyprus shall be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey. A treaty of

military alliance shall also be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

These two instruments shall have constitutional force. (This last paragraph shall be inserted in the Constitution as a basic article.)

22. It shall be recognized that the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other state, or a separatist independence for Cyprus (i.e., the partition of Cyprus into two independent states), shall be excluded.

23. The Republic of Cyprus shall accord most-favored-nation treatment to Great Britain, Greece and Turkey for all agreements, whatever their nature.

This provision shall not apply to the treaties between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom concerning the bases and military facilities accorded to the United Kingdom.

24. The Greek and Turkish Governments shall have the right to subsidize institutions for education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to their respective communities.

Equally, where either community considers that it has not the necessary number of schoolmasters, professors or priests for the working of its institutions, the Greek and Turkish Governments may provide them to the extent strictly necessary to meet their needs.

25. One of the following ministries—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Finance—shall be entrusted to a Turk. If the President and the Vice President agree, they may replace this system by a system of rotation.

26. The new state which is to come into being with the signature of the treaties shall be established as quickly as possible and within a period of not more than three months from the signature of the treaties.

27. All the above points shall be considered to be basic articles of the Constitution of Cyprus.

ANNEX I

(A) The defense questions subject to veto under Point 8 of the basic structure are as follows:

(a) Composition and size of the armed forces and credits for them.

(b) Appointments and promotions.

(c) Imports of warlike stores and of all kinds of explosives.

(d) Granting of bases and other facilities to allied countries.

(B) The security questions subject to veto are as follows:

- (a) Appointments and promotions.
- (b) Allocation and stationing of forces.
- (c) Emergency measures and martial law.
- (d) Police laws.

(It is provided that the right of veto shall cover all emergency measures or decisions but not those which concern the normal functioning of the police and gendarmerie.)

B. Treaty of Guarantee

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey of the other part:

I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the basic articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest;

II. Desiring to cooperate to insure that the provisions of the aforesaid Constitution shall be respected;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to insure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever. With this intent it prohibits all activity tending to promote directly or indirectly either union or partition of the island.

ARTICLE 2

Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey, taking note of the undertakings by the Republic of Cyprus embodied in Article 1, recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus and also the provisions of the basic article of its Constitution.

They likewise undertake to prohibit, as far as lies within their power, all activity having the object of promoting directly or

indirectly either the union of the Republic of Cyprus with any other state or the partition of the island.

ARTICLE 3

In the event of any breach of the provisions of the present treaty, Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to making representations or taking the necessary steps to insure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present treaty.

ARTICLE 4

The present treaty shall enter into force on signature.

The high contracting parties undertake to register the present treaty at the earliest possible date with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter.

C. Treaty of Alliance

1. The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey shall cooperate for their common defense and undertake by this treaty to consult together on the problems raised by this defense.

2. The high contracting parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

3. In the spirit of this alliance and in order to fulfill the above purpose, a tripartite headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

4. Greece shall take part in the headquarters mentioned in the preceding article with a contingent of 950 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers and Turkey, with a contingent of 650 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The President and the Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, may ask the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents.

5. The Greek and Turkish officers mentioned above shall be responsible for the

training of the army of the Republic of Cyprus.

6. The command of the tripartite headquarters shall be assumed in rotation and for a period of one year each by a Cypriote, Greek and Turkish general officer, who shall be nominated by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President and the Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus.

III. DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, comprising the basic structure for the Republic of Cyprus, the treaty of guarantee and the treaty of alliance, drawn up and approved by the heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11, 1959, and taking into account the consultations in London, from February 11 to 16, 1959, between the foreign ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom,

Declare:

A. That, subject to the acceptance of their requirements as set out in Section B below, they accept the documents approved by the heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

B. That, with the exception of two areas at

(a) Akrotiri-Episkopi-Paramali, and
(b) Dhekelia-Pergamos-Ayios-Nikolaos-Xylophagou, which will be retained under full British sovereignty, they are willing to transfer sovereignty over the island of Cyprus to the Republic of Cyprus subject to the following conditions:

(1) That such rights are secured to the United Kingdom Government as are necessary to enable the two areas as aforesaid to be used effectively as military bases, including among others those rights indicated in the annex attached, and that satisfactory guarantees are given by Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus for the integrity of the areas retained under British sovereignty and the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights referred to above.

(2) That provision shall be made by agreement for: the protection of the fundamental human rights of the various communities in Cyprus; the protection of the interests of the members of the public services in Cyprus; determining the nationality of persons affected by the settlement; the assumption by the Republic of Cyprus of the appropriate obligations of the present Government of Cyprus, including the settlement of claims.

C. That the Government of the United Kingdom welcome the draft treaty of alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey and will cooperate with the parties thereto in the common defense of Cyprus.

D. That the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus shall come into force and the formal signature of the necessary instruments by the parties concerned shall take place at the earliest practicable date and on that date sovereignty will be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus.

ANNEX

The following rights will be necessary in connection with the areas to be retained under British sovereignty:

(a) to continue to use, without restriction or interference, the existing small sites containing military and other installations and to exercise complete control within these sites, including the right to guard and defend them and to exclude from them all persons not authorized by the United Kingdom Government;

(b) to use roads, ports and other facilities freely for the movement of personnel and stores of all kinds to and from and between the above-mentioned areas and sites;

(c) to continue to have the use of specified port facilities at Famagusta;

(d) to use public services (such as water, telephone, telegraph, electric power, etc.);

(e) to use from time to time certain localities, which would be specified, for troop training;

(f) to use the airfield at Nicosia, together with any necessary buildings and facilities on or connected with the airfield to whatever extent is considered necessary by the British authorities for the operation of British military aircraft in peace and war, including the

exercise of any necessary operational control of air traffic;

(g) to overfly the territory of the Republic of Cyprus without restriction;

(h) to exercise jurisdiction over British forces to an extent comparable with that provided in Article VII of the agreement regarding the status of forces of parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, in respect of certain offenses committed within the territory of the Republic of Cyprus;

(i) to employ freely in the areas and sites labor from other parts of Cyprus;

(j) to obtain, after consultation with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the use of such additional small sites and such additional rights as the United Kingdom may, from time to time, consider technically necessary for the efficient use of its base areas and installations in Cyprus:

IV. ADDITIONAL ARTICLE TO BE INSERTED IN THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus undertake to respect the integrity of the areas to be retained under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom upon the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to the United Kingdom by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom.

V. DECLARATION MADE BY THE GREEK AND TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 17, 1959

The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, having considered the declaration made by the Government of the United Kingdom on February 17, 1959, accept that declaration, together with the document approved by the heads of the Greek and Turkish Governments in Zurich on February 11, 1959, as providing the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

VI. DECLARATION MADE BY ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS

Archbishop Makarios, representing the Greek Cypriote community, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus drawn up and approved by the heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11, 1959, and the declarations made by the Government of the United Kingdom, and by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey on February 17, 1959, declares that he accepts the documents and declarations as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

VII. DECLARATION BY DR. FAZIL KUTCHUK

Dr. Kutchuk, representing the Turkish Cypriote community, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus drawn up and approved by the heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11, 1959, and the declarations made by the Government of the United Kingdom, and by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey on February 17, 1959, declares that he accepts the documents and declarations as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

VIII. AGREED MEASURES TO PREPARE FOR THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN CYPRUS

1. All parties to the conference firmly endorse the aim of bringing the Constitution (including the elections of President, Vice President and the three Assemblies) and the treaties into full effect as soon as practicable and in any case not later than twelve months from today's date (the 19th of February, 1959). Measures leading to the transfer of sovereignty in Cyprus will begin at once.

2. The first of these measures will be the immediate establishment of:

(A) A joint commission in Cyprus with the duty of completing a draft constitution for the independent Republic of Cyprus, incorporating the basic structure agreed at the Zurich conference. This commission shall be composed of one representative each of

the Greek Cypriote and the Turkish Cypriote community and one representative nominated by the Government of Greece and one representative nominated by the Government of Turkey, together with a legal adviser nominated by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, and shall in its work have regard to and shall scrupulously observe the points contained in the documents of the Zurich conference and shall fulfill its task in accordance with the principles there laid down.

(B) A transitional committee in Cyprus, with responsibility for drawing up plans for adapting and reorganizing the governmental machinery in Cyprus in preparation for the transfer of authority to the independent Republic of Cyprus. This committee shall be composed of the Governor of Cyprus, the leading representative of the Greek community, the leading representative of the Turkish community and other Greek and Turkish Cypriotes nominated by the Governor after consultation with the two leading representatives in such a way as not to conflict with Paragraph 5 of the basic structure.

(C) A joint committee in London composed of representatives of each of the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and one representative each of the Greek Cypriote and Turkish Cypriote communities, with the duty of preparing the final treaties giving effect to the conclusions of the London conference. This committee

will prepare drafts for submission to Governments covering *inter alia* matters arising from the retention of areas in Cyprus under British sovereignty, the provision to the United Kingdom Government of certain ancillary rights and facilities in the independent Republic of Cyprus, questions of nationality, the treatment of the liabilities of the present Government of Cyprus and the financial and economic problems arising from the creation of an independent Republic of Cyprus.

3. The Governor will, after consultation with the two leading representatives, invite individual members of the transitional committee to assume special responsibilities for particular departments and functions of government. This process will be started as soon as possible and will be progressively extended.

4. The headquarters mentioned in Article 4 of the treaty of alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey will be established three months after the completion of the work of the commission referred to in paragraph 2 (A) above and will be composed of a restricted number of officers who will immediately undertake the training of the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents will enter the territory of the Republic of Cyprus on the date when the sovereignty will be transferred to the Republic.

"In spite of the attraction of Communism to underdeveloped peoples, most of these peoples still want to achieve rapid industrialization, and the rising standard of living this promises, without resort to totalitarian economics and the police-state. But they realize that under the conditions prevailing in their countries the basic industries must be built by their governments, with economic help (long-time and easy loans and credits and in some cases even grants for capital goods, machines, and technicians) from the advanced industrial countries, particularly from the United States. They want to go slower than the Communists, allow the myriad of small industries to operate through private enterprise, travel a middle path of social democracy between Communism and Capitalism, win both bread and liberty, achieve both rapid industrialization and freedom.

"With respect to the anti-imperialist revolutions, our chief concern is to prevent any additional mergers of anti-imperialist revolutions and Communist revolutions, as occurred in China and in North Viet Nam. Further such mergers would dangerously upset the balance of power in favor of Communism."

—William G. Carleton, Professor of Political Science, University of Florida, *Time for Cold War Offensive—Now*, an address delivered at the University of Arkansas, December 11, 1958.

Received At Our Desk

Politics and Economics . . .

SOVIET POLICY AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, 1931-1946. By CHARLES B. McLANE. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. 310 pages, appendix, bibliography and index, \$5.50.)

The Sino-Soviet alliance is the cornerstone of the international Communist movement. Just as an accurate appraisal of its strengths and weaknesses is essential for effective policy formulation, so any meaningful understanding of the present depends upon detailed knowledge of the past. Nowhere was this more cogently relevant than in the years when relations between Moscow and the Chinese Communists were shrouded in mystery. This critical period has long been surrounded by the secrecy so characteristic of all Communist activities. Systematic investigation has also suffered from a dearth of suitable documentary material. A plethora of facile interpretations, too often based on fragmentary evidence, has further compounded the confusion associated with this period.

Professor McLane's balanced presentation of relations between the Soviet government and the Chinese Communists during the 1931-1946 period is a valuable, welcome contribution, certain to receive deserved acclaim and attention. It represents the highest level of scholarship. Combining extensive research, an impressive command of material, and a keen analytical mind, the author guides us skillfully through an obscure facet of modern history.

With meticulous care he traces "Mao's rise to power during the Kiangsi era (1931-1934) and his relationship to the Party hierarchy during those years." This is important to an understanding of the subsequent history of the Chinese Communist movement for, after 1935, it "bore

the stamp of the Kiangsi era rather than that of the presoviet period when the movement had been under the tutelage of the Comintern." Moscow's "cautious and somewhat enigmatic" early estimate of Mao is discussed, as is Mao's assumption of Party, as well as governmental, control in January, 1935.

Interesting, objectively developed chapters are devoted to the united front period (1937-1941) and to Chinese Communist policies during the Second World War. Particular attention is devoted to the triangular relationships of the Chinese Communists, the Kuomintang and the Soviet Union. Moscow's changing assessment of Mao's capabilities is treated with care and sophistication. The lengthy chapter on the complex, confused, and highly crucial 1945-1946 period deserves special attention, for it sheds much light on the Kremlin's approach to the entire question of China, both during this period and since.

The author offers three concluding observations which are particularly relevant today. First, he states that there is no "clear evidence that the Russians made any strenuous efforts during this period (1931-1946) to intervene in the internal political affairs of the Chinese Communist Party in support of one faction over another." Second, there is also no evidence to indicate that the Chinese Communists, "for their part, ever used their independence either to evade Soviet policies which they may have found objectionable or to refute formulations in Marxism-Leninism which the Kremlin endorsed as dogma valid for Communists everywhere." The Chinese Communists accepted Moscow's major foreign policy shifts of the 1930's without question. Third, Moscow, to the best of our knowledge, has not expressed its disapproval of Chinese Communist policies since January, 1931. "If at times the Russians seemed to take little interest in the Chinese Communists, this was

doubtless due to their preoccupation with more urgent matters elsewhere and, after 1937, to their desire not to antagonize Chungking, and later Washington, by appearing to show too great a concern with a rebellious faction in China." Moscow's seeming inattention did not reflect indifference. "No evidence exists, in short, to cast serious doubts on the underlying allegiance of the Chinese Communists to Moscow during these years and on Moscow's confidence in their loyalty."

These observations are certainly pertinent for any evaluation of the durability of the Sino-Soviet alliance. China is not apt soon to prove another Tito.

Professor McLane's study is based in great measure upon Russian sources. If added information becomes available from the Chinese side our detailed knowledge may increase, but the soundness of his analysis is not likely to be challenged. This volume will undoubtedly be accorded a prominent position with the few outstanding studies in this area.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

THE SOVIET NAVY. EDITED BY COMMANDER M. G. SAUNDERS, R.N. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. 340 pages and index, \$7.50.)

Soviet military technology has made impressive advances during the past decade. But preoccupation with the military implications of Sputnik and Lunik has led to relative neglect of the growing challenge of Soviet naval strength. Though Russia has traditionally been a land power, it is devoting much attention to the naval arm of its military establishment. For example, current estimates hold that the Soviet Union has between 200 and 300 long-range, operational submarines. Nazi Germany went to war with less than 75 such undersea craft and came perilously close to winning the battle of the Atlantic.

This symposium seeks to fill a glaring gap in our knowledge of Soviet naval capabilities, developments and strategy. Four introductory essays trace the history of the Russian navy from the time of Peter the Great to the Second World War. However, the bulk of the book deals with

analyses of the present. Hanson Baldwin, military analyst for *The New York Times*, contributes a perceptive piece on the overall strategic setting. Detailed chapters on the organization and training of Soviet naval personnel, the kinds of fighting ships being built by the Soviet Union, the nature of the Soviet submarine threat, and the role of geography in Soviet naval strategy are presented. Generally speaking, the essays are clearly written, well organized and bear the imprint of experienced, analytical judgment.

The book should appeal to a broad audience, and not merely to specialists on naval affairs. Its principal shortcoming is the absence of any bibliography. A. Z. R.

NEHRU AND DEMOCRACY. BY DONALD E. SMITH. (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., Inc., 1958. 194 pages, bibliography and index, \$5.25.)

The importance of India to the free world has often been emphasized. Yet surprisingly little is known of the IDEAS of the man who more than any other individual represents India. Jawaharlal Nehru is a complex, controversial figure, not easily catalogued nor understood. This interesting volume provides a useful analysis of Nehru's ideas about democracy.

Professor Smith's treatment is sympathetic and comprehensive. He has undertaken a review of Nehru's voluminous writings over the past generation, pruned their essence, and interpreted them in the light of Indian political development. He finds Nehru amazingly consistent in most of his political beliefs. However, clear inconsistencies have developed on economic questions, e.g., Nehru's statements on the "socialistic pattern of society." Professor Smith ably traces Nehru's development, evaluates the impact of Gandhi on Nehru, the latter's involvement with the Congress Party, and Nehru's role in India's struggle for independence.

Nehru's ideas on freedom, representative government, political leadership, and the role of the individual in a democratic society are carefully developed. There is an excellent treatment of Nehru's beliefs, and seeming fluctuations, on the matter of a socialist society. Particularly important is

the chapter devoted to Nehru's influence on the development of India as a secular state.

The author is correct in stating that "the future of democracy in India may depend in large measure on the degree to which Jawaharlal Nehru succeeds in interpreting, applying, and adapting democratic ideas to the political life of this people." Though Nehru may often irritate Westerners by his political statements, he is essentially committed to Western democratic beliefs, values, and political institutions. Accordingly, he must be aided economically in his urgent efforts to bring India into the twentieth century. The need is great; the time is now. Dr. Smith has added to our knowledge and understanding of one of this century's great leaders.

A. Z. R.

POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES. BY ANSLEY J. COALE AND EDGAR M. HOOVER. (Princeton University Press, 1958. Appendix and index, 389 pages, \$8.50.)

COLONIAL PLANNING. A Comparative Study. BY BARBU NICULESCU. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1958. Distributed by the Macmillan Company. Appendix, bibliography and index, 208 pages, \$4.25.)

The discontent and turmoil that characterize the newly emergent and emerging societies of Africa, the Middle East and Asia, can only be made more manageable through a rapid and extensive program of economic development. Eugene R. Black, President of the International Bank, has stated that "economic development in these countries today is not just a process—it is also an idea, a rallying cry for more and more millions who are aroused against their traditional poverty." Whether these pressures for change take a democratic or dictatorial direction will depend in great measure upon the success experienced by these countries in their efforts to improve the lot of their populations. In recent years, an increasing number of studies have appeared dealing with various aspects of economic development.

The first book reviewed here is concerned with the effect of population growth upon the economic development of underdeveloped areas. The authors, two eminent experts on population problems, focus their efforts in an attempt to answer a specific question, namely: "What difference would it make in economic terms if the birth rate, instead of remaining unchanged, should be cut drastically in this generation?" Their attention centers particularly on the situation of India, but their conclusions apply equally to other underdeveloped countries as well.

Starting with a short summary and analysis of current theories on the relationship between economic development and population growth, Drs. Coale and Hoover describe "the recent, current, and future (alternative) population of India in terms of size, age composition, growth rate, and birth and death rates, giving the likely upper and lower limits to population growth during the next twenty-five years." They then show "how economic development would be influenced by the trend of population growth—upper or lower—that is actually followed." These are further translated into the course and probable success of the particular development pattern adopted by the Indian Government. Relying on the best available quantitative data, and on their observations in the field, the authors have constructed interesting and challenging mathematical models within which they develop their analysis.

Dr. Niculescu's volume deals with a number of the countries of Africa. His approach is broader, analyzing in particular the specific plans for economic development adopted by such areas as Kenya, the Belgian Congo, Uganda, and the Rhodesias, the machinery established to carry on development projects, and the problems faced. Though his canvas is large, he succeeds in compressing an enormous amount of information and analysis into this small study.

Both books are well-organized, lucidly written, and reflect the deliberate, serious study of able scholars. Both add to our knowledge of a vital, increasingly important subject.

A.Z.R.

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BELOW THE TIDE. BY PENELOPE TREMAYNE. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959. 187 pages and glossary, \$3.00.)

Surely it seemed to many American observers that the political dilemma of Cyprus was almost insoluble. To Penelope Tremayne, writing without benefit of hindsight before settlement of the Cyprus dispute, self-government was the obvious answer: as one Cypriote laborer put it: "nobody wants Enosis now. We just want the right to control our own lives and to be our own masters."

Miss Tremayne went to Cyprus as a Red Cross field officer because she could speak Greek, and *Below the Tide* is a well written narrative of the year she spent among the Cypriotes. She was impressed by the major role played by rumor and fear in whipping up hatred and violence among an ignorant but peaceable people. The reader will also be amazed, as she was, to learn that under the British, Cypriote children were educated for generations by Greek textbooks emphasizing the heroic Greek struggle for freedom, so that the Cypriotes could not fail to identify themselves with the Greeks. Although she tried "to avoid touching on political questions," Miss Tremayne noted in her foreword that "Most misunderstandings can be cleared up, if both sides wish it." In the light of the Cyprus settlement, this is informative and entertaining reading.

THE LITTLE WORLD OF LAOS. By ODEN MEEKER. With a Picture Essay by Homer Page. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959. 246 pages, bibliography, index and photographs, \$4.50.)

First representative of CARE in Laos and a sensitive writer, Oden Meeker has the opportunity and the ability to give the reader a vivid picture of "one of the most appealing nations in the world." Laos is "the Land of the Million Elephants and the White Parasol." "The Lao Way of Life," writes the author, "which now seems fated to change abruptly, and perhaps somewhat awkwardly and uncomfortably, is the expression of an ancient, peaceful, Buddhist civilization whose origins are lost in the mists of Chinese and Indian

antiquity." Not only Laos, but Thailand and Cambodia are also described here, and the wonderful photographs by Homer Page add to the charm of this small volume. Oden Meeker adds some personal comments on the value of American aid in Southeast Asia.

SEVEN ROADS TO MOSCOW. By LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. G. F. JACKSON. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. Illustrated with 120 diagrams and maps. 334 pages and index, with preface, \$7.50.)

The author traces the history of the invasions of Russia from the Vikings through the Second World War. In giving an account of the attacks by "Vikings, Huns, Tartars, Poles, Swedes, French and Germans, each in their turn," the author summarizes the growth of the Russian state. He also describes the military leaders, both Russian and foreign, who fought these great battles; the international political milieu in which these campaigns occurred is well presented.

Russia has been invaded from North or South (the River Road) and from East or West. According to Colonel Jackson, "From the military point of view, the Varangian invasion is unique in Russian history. It was the first and only invasion which has been lastingly successful. Moreover, it was the only invasion, with the exception of the momentary passage of the Goths, which came down the River Road. All subsequent invasions have come from east or west, and have succumbed to the natural genius of the Russian People, and to the defensive strength of the Russian lands."

The River Road has four distinct advantages: "Firstly, it turned the natural defensive strength of the great Russian rivers. Secondly, these rivers could be used as roads, thus overcoming the lack of communications which impeded invaders using entirely land routes. Thirdly, the majority of the Russian cities and towns lay on these natural highways. By controlling the rivers, the Vikings and the Tartars controlled Russia. And fourthly,

this route running from North to South was finite; whereas the land route from West to East was militarily infinite as the western invaders found to their cost." However, such an invasion required sea power and Napoleon and Hitler had strength only in land power. "Fortunately for Russia," continues the Colonel, "England, the principal sea power in the world during Napoleon's and Hitler's invasions, was her ally."

There are many factors involved in the failure of the three modern attempts to invade Russia by land—that of Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon I, and Adolf Hitler. The principal error was common to all three, i.e., "failure to disrupt Russia's means of mobilisation. If these cannot be destroyed, then preparations must be made for a very long war." However, all three "prepared only for a quick decisive campaign. When this failed they were caught off balance without adequate reserves with which to regain the initiative."

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND. An Outline of History. By M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. 369 pages, bibliography, notes, and indexes, \$7.50.)

This book provides a thorough and scholarly history of the socialist movement in Poland from its inception in the 1830's to the final monolithic form of the Communist party (the United Polish Workers' Party). Part I of the book explores the origins of "Polish socialism, born in exile, spawned by the émigré groups who had fled from the Congress Kingdom of Poland to the West, mainly to France and England, after the unsuccessful insurrection against Russia in 1830-31." Parts II, III and IV trace the development of "The Communist Party of Poland," "The Polish Workers' Party," and "The United Polish Workers' Party."

In the final chapters the author deals with Poland's current political dilemma. This book, which is the first history of socialism in Poland, will prove valuable to the student and specialist in Soviet and East European affairs.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin Crisis

- March 1—The U.S.S.R. and East Germany open negotiations to discuss a peace treaty for East Germany.
- March 2—The Soviet Union agrees to a foreign ministers' meeting to precede a summit conference. However, the Russians propose representation parity, i.e., that Poland and Czechoslovakia also be invited.
- March 3—British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev state their failure to reach agreement on Berlin.
- March 5—Visiting the Leipzig Fair, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev says that the May 27 deadline for returning Soviet control of East Germany to the East German government is not absolute; reasonable negotiations could lead to an extension of this deadline. The Russian leader declares that the Soviet Union will retain its authority over entry routes to West Berlin.
- March 9—Soviet Premier Khrushchev recommends that either the Big Four Powers or neutral forces guarantee West Berlin's integrity if an agreement can be reached on ending occupation status there. His only condition is that West Berlin not be a party to any "pact of a military-political nature."
- March 10—Khrushchev opens negotiations with the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) on his plans for ending Western occupation of West Berlin.
- British leader Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Lloyd return to London after conferring in Paris with French leaders on the Berlin situation.
- March 11—U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower emphatically says that "We are certainly not going to fight a ground war in Europe." At the same time he declares that nuclear war is not an "impossibility."
- March 12—West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer tells Macmillan, who comes to Bonn to report on his recent talks with Soviet leaders, that his government is opposed to any troop reduction in Europe except as part of a "general disarmament agreement."
- March 16—President Eisenhower declares that he is willing to meet at the Summit with the 'Big Four heads of government provided preliminary arrangements are fruitful. Eisenhower also tells his U.S. television audience that the U.S. will not abandon two million West Berliners.
- March 19—At a news conference, Premier Khrushchev says that he is willing to agree to a foreign ministers' meeting on May 11, even though he has not received a Western invitation yet. He suggests that the talks be limited to discussing a German peace treaty and Berlin's status.
- March 20—Harold Macmillan and President Eisenhower open talks on a unified Western policy towards the Soviet proposals for a demilitarized Berlin.
- March 21—Macmillan and Eisenhower agree on a summer summit conference with Soviet Premier Khrushchev. They are prepared to accept Poland and Czechoslovakia as observers, not participants.
- March 22—Eisenhower, Macmillan, U.S. Acting Secretary of State Christian A. Herter and British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd meet with U.S. Secretary of State John F. Dulles, who is recuperating from cancer therapy. It is presumed that Secretary Dulles has been asked to accept the British-U.S. position on holding a summit conference despite possible deadlock at the foreign ministers' meeting in May.
- March 23—Eisenhower and Macmillan end talks after reaching general agreement.
- March 25—President Eisenhower denies that he has promised to attend a summit conference "unconditionally." He declares that he has never wavered from his view that a summit conference must have fruitful and thorough preliminary preparation.
- March 26—Britain, France and the U.S. send notes to the U.S.S.R. inviting her to

a foreign ministers' conference on the questions of a German peace treaty and the ending of Berlin's occupation.

West Germany objects to French acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's eastern-most border.

March 27—A declaration made by Soviet Premier Khrushchev at the Leipzig Fair on March 7 is released. In this declaration Khrushchev asserts that it is "unrealistic" to attempt to unify Germany at this time, and that two Germanies will continue to exist for a while.

March 29—The Soviet Union urges that Nato and the Warsaw Pact nations sign a treaty of nonaggression. He also urges the withdrawal of both Western and Communist forces from the Central European zone.

March 30—The Soviet Union agrees to an East-West foreign ministers' meeting to be followed by a summit conference. The Soviet note to France (who stipulated conditional summit talks) states that if the foreign ministers' meeting should fail, it would be all the more necessary to have a summit conference.

March 31—It is disclosed that last week Soviet fighter planes buzzed and threatened a U.S. aircraft en route to Berlin. The Russians protest that the U.S. plane violated the 10,000 mile ceiling on Allied flights on the air corridors to Berlin. The U.S. denies that there is such a ceiling.

The foreign ministers of France, Britain and West Germany meet in Washington with U.S. Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter to discuss the Berlin crisis. U.S., British and French ministers issue a statement to the effect that a summer summit conference is conditional on the outcome of the foreign ministers' meeting in May. They say their invitations to the Soviet Union to attend a foreign ministers' meeting made this point clear.

Disarmament

March 19—The three power conference considering a ban on nuclear weapons testing recesses until April 13, according to a Western request.

Nato

March 13—A French decision to retain French command of the third of the

French Mediterranean fleet set aside for Nato command in wartime is made known in Paris. Observers believe France wants to keep all her Mediterranean forces free to protect supply lines to Algeria; French President de Gaulle is also said to be dissatisfied with France's role in Nato and in Western policy making.

March 17—A treaty is completed which in effect reduces special privileges for Nato troops stationed in West Germany and makes foreign servicemen subject to West German courts for offenses against West German law.

United Nations

March 7—Eight African states ask the General Assembly to appoint a special commissioner to supervise elections in the French Cameroon before independence.

March 12—The trusteeship committee of the General Assembly supports a resolution to admit the French Cameroon to the U.N. without new general elections.

March 13—Dr. Djalal Abdoh of Iran is elected plebiscite commissioner for the British Cameroon by the General Assembly. In two plebiscites, 1.5 million inhabitants will decide their future status.

March 23—The U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation begins its sixth session.

West Europe

March 3—A 9-member commission representing the European Economic Community reports that the British suggestion for a free trade area is a "purely theoretical conception," and not practical.

March 5—The High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community declares that member nations should limit mining and importing coal, following a Belgian appeal that a Belgian coal strike constitutes a "manifest crisis." The decision must be approved by the Council of Ministers.

March 17—The Consultative Committee of the European Coal and Steel Community turns down a plan for limiting coal production and importing.

March 23—The Council of Ministers discusses coal mining and import restrictions without coming to a decision. Details will be received by member states by April 15. Unemployment pay is promised for Belgian miners.

ARGENTINA

March 24—A wave of strikes continues. Some 1000 policemen clash with rioters who are demonstrating against a 100 per cent increase in electricity rates.

AUSTRIA

March 4—Foreign Minister Leopold Figl declares that the question of South Tyrol (Upper Adige) will be submitted to international arbitration if negotiations with Italy fail. Austria accuses Italy of violating the Paris agreement of 1946 guaranteeing local autonomy to the German population in Tyrol.

March 6—The twelve year old coalition of Conservatives and Socialists in the Austrian government agrees to break up and call a general election.

BELGIAN CONGO

March 9—Belgian Minister for the Congo Maurice van Hemelrijck plans to fly to the Congo to confer with Abako leaders, whose tribe is now illegal because of the outbreak of rioting last January.

March 16—Three leaders of the nationalist movement declare that they are willing to "discuss at the right time and in the right place" Belgium's program for gradual self-government for the Congolese.

March 28—A parliamentary commission of nine reports that the January riots were in large part provoked by the attitude of the whites toward the Africans.

BOLIVIA

March 2—Bolivians stage an anti-U.S. demonstration because of a *Time* magazine report of a U.S. official's statement suggesting that Bolivia be divided among its neighbors. President Hernan Siles Zuazo tries to control the mob.

March 5—The anti-U.S. agitation subsides.

March 12—The tin miners' strike continues into its ninth day. The tin union is calling for a general strike in support of the miners' walkout. The miners are on strike to demand the maintenance of government subsidies to keep prices in miners' commissaries 40 per cent lower than in the city of La Paz. The Cabinet meets to consider the crisis, which has grown acute with Bolivia's foreign exchange reserves down to \$500,000. U.S. credits to Bolivia,

which expired in February, have been suspended.

March 14—President Zuazo signs an agreement with the International Monetary Fund for an economic stabilization program in Bolivia. The contract, which must be approved by the U.S., cancels state subsidies to miners' commissaries. Zuazo calls tin miners and farmers to arms to prevent the mine strike from growing into a general strike.

March 16—Tin union leaders order workers to return to their jobs following a settlement for a 20 per cent wage increase and subsidies to commissaries until further studies are made. Such a pledge appears to be in flat contradiction to the International Monetary Fund agreement just signed.

March 18—The Government reduces subsidies on miners' food, fuel and clothing by 50 per cent. Workers are given a 7.5 per cent wage increase.

March 20—The U.S. State Department, according to its officials, does not intend to reduce its aid program to Bolivia.

BRAZIL

March 14—President Juscelino Kubitschek opens the Congress with a message lauding U.S. aid to all of Latin America through the Inter-American Development Bank.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH**Canada**

March 5—In the Six Nation Indian reserve in Ontario, hereditary chiefs lead rebel Indians, seizing the council house, taking over the government and seceding from Canada. The reserve is 12 miles square.

March 11—After some 70 days of a loggers' strike, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police sends reinforcements to Newfoundland. Eleven thousand loggers are striking against the Bowater Pulp and Paper Company and the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company. Premier J. R. Smallwood of Newfoundland is trying to set up a new union, the Brotherhood of Newfoundland Woodworkers, to replace the recently outlawed International Woodworkers Union. A Canadian branch of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters is also involved in the strike.

March 12—Canada and the U.S. publish tolls for the St. Lawrence Seaway, effective April 1.

March 13—Premier Smallwood tells the Newfoundland legislature he has asked Prime Minister Diefenbaker for a royal commission investigation of the labor situation.

March 14—The Canadian Labor Congress calls an executive committee emergency meeting to consider ways to support Newfoundland's striking loggers.

March 16—Commissioner Leonard H. Nicholson, head of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, resigns because of the refusal of the federal government to send additional police troops to Newfoundland. His letter of resignation is read in the House of Commons. Prime Minister Diefenbaker refuses Smallwood's request for an inquiry, asks for a two-week cooling off period and asserts that Smallwood has added to Newfoundland's labor difficulties by interfering in the logger strike.

March 17—Secretary of State for External Affairs Sidney E. Smith dies of a heart attack.

March 21—Premier Smallwood says he decertified the International Woodworkers of America as the sole bargaining agent for the loggers but he did not outlaw the union.

March 23—Charles Edward Rivett-Carnac replaces L. H. Nicholson as Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

March 25—Prime Minister Diefenbaker reveals a plan to increase federal aid to the province of Newfoundland between now and March, 1962; the increase will amount to \$36.5 million.

March 31—Premier Smallwood's government of Newfoundland files suit against the federal government of Canada for damages because of Diefenbaker's refusal to send additional police troops into Newfoundland to help keep order in the loggers' strike.

Ceylon

March 3—A one-day general strike protests the revision of a public security act increasing the emergency powers of the Government. The Government says the strike has failed but N. M. Perera, President of the Ceylon Federation of Labor, says he did not intend to paralyze the economy.

March 12—Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike receives wider emergency powers from the Senate; the new Public Security Act allows him to put down civil disorder and outlaw political strikes.

March 13—Governor General Sir Oliver Goonetilleke signs the Public Security Act; the long-lasting state of emergency throughout Ceylon is declared ended. The Prime Minister can declare a new state of emergency at any time.

Great Britain

(See also *International, Berlin Crisis.*)

March 2—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan refuses to accept Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev's suggestion that U.S. air bases in Britain should be eliminated and that Britain and the U.S.S.R. should sign a nonaggression pact.

In a financial agreement released today, Britain and Egypt waive all war damage claims stemming from the Suez invasion of 1956.

March 3—President Eisenhower asks Macmillan to discuss the Berlin crisis with him in Washington.

March 6—The British Ambassador in Dublin tells the government of the Irish Republic that Britain is concerned because the Irish government has released from internment Irish Republican Army men.

March 13—In response to an invitation from the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, an unofficial Russian delegation arrives in London to talk to Labor members of Commons.

March 16—Voting 300 to 230, Commons defeats a Labor party action to censure the Conservative Government for the 1956 Suez adventure.

March 24—Britain and the U.S.S.R. sign a civil air agreement in Moscow.

India

March 14—Sheik Mohammed Abdullah and 23 others accused of conspiring to overthrow the government of Kashmir stand trial in Jammu, Kashmir.

March 18—The U.S. agrees to lend India the equivalent of \$200 million earned by the sale of surplus wheat and other farm products. U.S. aid to India since 1947 is estimated at some \$1.6 billion.

March 27—Prime Minister Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed of Kashmir reveals that there

are no longer restrictions on travel in and out of Kashmir for Indian citizens and the people of Kashmir.

Malaya

March 28—In a White Paper published in Kuala Lumpur, the Government says that Chinese Communists and other foreign Communists are helping Malaya's Communist party as part of a scheme to take over Malaya.

Pakistan

March 18—Four agreements are signed by the U.S. and Pakistan providing for a U.S. loan of up to \$56.5 million from the Development Loan Fund for projects in Pakistan.

March 23—President Mohammed Ayub Khan says Pakistan will get a new constitution "only when the mess created in the past looks like it is being cleared up and vital reforms that have been launched get going."

March 26—Ayub Khan issues a presidential decree disqualifying from public office for up to 15 years anyone found guilty of "misconduct" in an elective office.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

British Somaliland

March 27—It is revealed that in the first general elections, on March 18, the moderate National United Front won 7 of 13 seats in the Legislative Council. The election was boycotted by the Somali National League.

Cyprus

March 1—Archbishop Makarios returns to Cyprus after a 3-year exile.

March 4—British and Cypriote leaders agree on a 10-man committee to plan to transfer power from Britain to Cyprus.

March 13—The E.O.K.A., National Organization of Cypriote Fighters, surrenders arms and ammunition.

March 17—Colonel George Grivas, known as "Dighenis," leader of the Cypriote underground, arrives in Athens. Grivas has been released by the British on condition that he return to Greece.

March 19—The Commons approves plans for an independent Cyprus. (For the text of the White Paper on Cypriote independence, see pages 294 ff. of this issue.)

March 27—Ten ministries are apportioned between Greek and Turkish Cypriotes on a 70-30 ratio. With a Greek President and a Turkish Vice-President these ministries will make up the provisional government of Cyprus working with the Governor and Executive Council.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

March 3—A state of emergency is declared in Nyasaland; rioting spreads. African leader Dr. Hastings Banda is arrested and flown from Nyasaland into Southern Rhodesia.

March 9—Armored cars and jet planes reinforce security forces in Nyasaland.

March 12—The Zambia African National Congress is outlawed by Governor of Northern Rhodesia Sir Arthur Benson.

March 20—As violence continues in Nyasaland, elections are held in Northern Rhodesia.

March 21—R. S. Garfield Todd's Central African party, identified with more liberal views of race relations, wins 3 seats in Northern Rhodesia's first multiracial election. At least 75 per cent of 7800 registered nonwhite voters have cast ballots, despite the proposal by the banned Zambia African National Congress that supporters boycott the polls.

March 23—Southern Rhodesia reveals that it plans to release 50 prisoners and withdraw its preventive detention bill.

March 24—A four-man commission of inquiry is named in London to investigate Nyasaland disturbances.

Maldivé Islands

March 13—In a dispatch in *The Times* of Ceylon, Moosa Ali Dida, described as director of the Publication Office of the United Suvadiva Islands, reveals that revolution has occurred in the Maldivé Islands in the Indian Ocean 400 miles southwest of Ceylon; a new government has been set up.

March 14—The Maldivé Government issues a communiqué declaring that immediate action will be taken against the rebels.

March 17—The Government ceases negotiation with Britain for a British air base; the British send a famine relief ship to the rebellious southern islands ignoring a 72-year old treaty by which Britain promised not to interfere in internal problems of

the islands. The treaty put the islands under British protection.

BULGARIA

March 14—Six ministers are dropped in a Cabinet shuffle. Trade minister and member of the Politburo Boris Taskov is among those removed.

March 26—The U.S. and Bulgaria resume diplomatic ties after a 9-year boycott.

BURMA

March 30—Burmese fight Nationalist Chinese troops in north Burma. The Chinese troops are the remainder of the Nationalist Army that fled from the Mainland in 1949.

CHINA (Nationalist)

March 18—The U.S. Development Loan Fund lends Taiwan \$686,000 for developing the fishing industries.

CHINA (The People's Republic)

March 1—Defense Minister Marshal Peng Teh-huai affirms that Communist China supports the Soviet stand on Berlin and declares that his government will come to the aid of East Germany in the event of Western aggression.

March 11—It is estimated that about 6000 Chinese just escaped from the Mainland to Macao.

March 16—Poland and Red China sign an agreement for over \$16 million in trade in 1959.

March 18—Yugoslavia and Red China sign a trade agreement for \$45 million in 1959.

March 29—The Communist Chinese hold their fire on the Nationalist offshore islands on this odd-numbered day.

COLOMBIA

March 3—Students riot throughout Bogota.

March 18—Deposed President Lieutenant General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla is found guilty of having violated the Constitution and of having abused the office of the presidency by a large vote in the Senate. General Rojas returned from exile in October, 1958, to stand trial.

March 24—President Alberto Lleras Camargo announces a new Cabinet composed equally of 6 Liberals and 6 Conservatives and one military figure in accordance with a national policy of bipartisan government. The Cabinet resigned last week.

CUBA

March 3—Forty-three Air Force men, acquitted by a Santiago court yesterday, will be tried again, according to Premier Fidel Castro.

March 4—Cuba's government takes over the Cuban Telephone Company.

March 7—The confiscatory law applying to the property of the members of the Batista regime is expanded by President Manuel Urrutia Lleo's cabinet to be more inclusive.

March 11—A public works program of some \$5,442,000 is approved by the Cabinet in an attempt to cut unemployment.

The Cabinet approves a salary increase for government workers.

March 19—*Revolucion*, the newspaper of Fidel Castro's rebel movement, announces that 483 have been executed by the revolutionary government and calls for a halt.

March 31—Thousands of civil servants employed by ex-President Fulgencio Batista are dismissed by the new regime; some 2000 had previously been ousted.

DENMARK

March 5—The new defense plan is announced to the Parliament. Denmark will reduce the size of her permanent armed forces and the length of compulsory military service.

ECUADOR

March 23—The U.S. Development Loan Fund agrees to give Ecuador a loan of \$4,700,000 for building its share of the Pan-American Highway.

ETHIOPIA

March 18—Ethiopia receives over \$7 million in credits from the West German government.

FRANCE (See also *International, Berlin Crisis*.)

March 3—The 12 nations of the French Overseas Community at a meeting of the Executive Council issue a communiqué supporting France on resisting Soviet moves to free West Berlin.

March 4—French President Charles de Gaulle meets with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. No statements are issued by either party.

March 8—Frenchmen go to the polls to elect some 500,000 mayors and municipal councillors who will elect France's new Senate next month.

March 9—Partial returns from the municipal elections reveal that the Communists have regained some of the popular vote from the Rightist Union for the New Republic.

March 11—The Ministry of the Interior reports that Communist gains in the recent elections were misrepresented: the Communists showed a gain only in the cities and their percentage of the total popular vote did not rise.

March 14—A crisis is reported in French-U.S. relations. France has refused to place one-third of its Mediterranean fleet under Nato as provided for in the Alliance.

March 15—Voters return to the polls in communities with less than 120,000 persons, where no party received a simple majority. In today's election, only a plurality of votes is needed to win.

March 16—Tallies reveal that Center and Leftist parties gained in the popular vote but lost seats.

FRENCH OVERSEAS COMMUNITY

Algeria

March 20—Delegate General for Algeria Paul Delouvrier announces his government's plans for developing Algeria and the Sahara: a large steel plant at Bône is scheduled for construction.

March 21—A battalion of 200–300 Algerian rebel soldiers in the National Liberation Army gives up their arms and surrenders voluntarily to the French Army.

Chad

March 13—Premier Gontchome Sahoulba and his government resign after one month. Socialist leader Ahmed Koula-mallah forms a new government.

Congo Republic

March 8—The Congo government decides to hold a referendum in the northern Congo to see whether tribal differences are strong enough to put through a vote of secession.

Malgache Republic

March 29—Five days of rain and floods devastate the island, formerly known as Madagascar.

French Sudan

March 8—Sudanese vote for 80 deputies to a new Legislative Assembly.

Voltaic Republic

March 1—It is announced that the Voltaic Republic yesterday adopted a draft constitution under which it would not join the new Mali Federation of West African states.

GERMANY, EAST (See *International, Berlin Crisis and the U.S.S.R.*)

GERMANY, WEST (See also *International, Berlin Crisis.*)

March 3—The Christian Democratic Union's parliamentary opposition to the transfer of Minister of the Economy Ludwig Erhard from active politics to the presidency overrules Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Erhard refuses the presidential nomination.

March 7—West Germany agrees to give East Germany \$21 million worth of credits for purchasing coal, steel and consumer goods. East Germany will compensate in 1960 in deliveries of soft coal, wheat and crude oil.

March 14—Industrialist Alfred Krupp asks the Allies to allow him to keep his large holdings in the iron and coal industries.

March 26—Russia and West Germany sign a 2-year cultural exchange agreement.

GREECE

March 4—Greek and Yugoslav leaders agree to close cooperation "within the framework of existing accords."

INDONESIA

March 2—Compulsory military service is ordered to curb rebel activities in Sumatra and the Celebes.

March 5—The Soviet Union gives Indonesia a \$12.5 million credit for a stadium.

The Indonesian government criticizes the U.S. for "hesitancy" in replying to Indonesian requests for military supplies.

March 6—Rebels in North Celebes attack the city of Manado.

March 14—It is reported that the Indonesian government plans to nationalize some 227 more Dutch plantations.

March 18—An Indonesian army official says that the rebel leader in north Sumatra has been ousted.

March 27—To halt the rising cost of living, Premier Djuanda authorizes territorial military commanders to regulate the prices of daily necessities.

IRAN

March 2—Deputy Foreign Minister Javad Sadr reports that Moscow has been informed that Iran repudiates articles 5 and 6 of a 1921 treaty which gives the Soviet Union the right to send troops into Iran when it is threatened by a third force.

March 8—The lower house of Parliament (Majlis) approves the Iranian-U.S. military agreement. The Senate will now act on the pact.

March 15—The Soviet Union declares that Iran cannot terminate the 1921 nonaggression treaty. Moscow declares it considers the treaty still in force.

IRAQ (See also *U.A.R.*)

March 8—Reports reveal that the pro-Communist government headed by the Premier, Major General Abdul Karim Kassim, is being challenged by a rebel group led by Colonel Abdel Wahab Shawaf, who favors pro-Arab and pro-Nasser policies.

March 9—Kassim reports the revolt has been put down but rebel radio broadcasts deny it.

March 10—It appears that Shawaf's revolt has been successfully crushed.

March 11—Eight members of the U.A.R.'s diplomatic staff in Baghdad are expelled. President Nasser of the U.A.R. accuses Premier Kassim and "Arab Communists" of attempting to divide his country and the entire Arab bloc.

March 12—The Iraqi radio charges the U.A.R. with conspiring against Kassim's government.

March 13—President Nasser continues his hostile criticism of Iraq and of Communist penetration in the Arab world.

March 14—Iraqi planes attack Syrian border villages. Iraqis charge that the recent uprising in Mosul was carried out with supplies received from Syria.

March 23—It is reported from Washington that British Prime Minister Macmillan says that he is willing to send arms to Iraq.

March 24—Iraq withdraws from the Baghdad Pact, composed of Britain, Turkey,

Iran, Pakistan, and which has U.S. support, assistance, and participation.

IRELAND

March 31—President Sean T. O'Kelly departs after a 2-week visit to the U.S.

ISRAEL

March 3—Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. and Permanent Representative to the U.N. Abba Eban resigns to run for the Knesset (Parliament).

March 8—An Israeli attaché to the Rumanian Legation is expelled by the Rumanian government for improper activities.

March 18—Israel protests to the U.N. Security Council over the U.A.R.'s seizure in the Suez Canal of two cargoes headed for Israel on ships flying foreign flags.

ITALY (See also *Austria*.)

March 6—Christian Democratic Premier Antonio Segni's government receives an overwhelming majority on a vote of confidence, which ends the investiture of Italy's new, all-Christian Democratic Cabinet.

March 16—Segni heals the split in his Christian Democratic party. The party's national council authorizes the new Cabinet to govern with the parliamentary support of the Rightist and neo-Fascist parties.

March 20—Premier Antonio Segni and other Italian leaders end two days of talks in Paris with French leaders concerning greater Italian participation in the East-West conference on Germany.

JAPAN

March 3—The Republic of (South) Korea asks Japan to reverse its decision to allow Korean nationals in Japan to return to North Korea if they so desire.

JORDAN

March 24—Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan on his visit to the U.S., President Eisenhower praises the King for withstanding outside pressure on his regime.

March 26—Hussein criticizes Nasser for opening the Arab world to Communist penetration in the first place (see also *Iraq*).

KOREA, SOUTH (See also *Japan*.)

March 1—President Syngman Rhee declares that South Korea will accept nationals

who were captured and taken to Japan during World War II, if Japan gives them proper compensation.

MEXICO

March 25—Some 14,000 railroad workers on two railway lines strike for higher wages.

March 29—The government arrests railroad union leaders.

March 30—Workers return to their jobs following the arrests of 3000 strikers.

March 31—Mexico expels two Russian attachés from the Soviet Embassy on the charge that they were involved in the railroad strike.

NEPAL

March 1—Returns from the February 18 elections to the 109-member house continue to come in.

March 19—It is reported that the Congress party has won 38 of the 55 seats which have been tallied to date.

NETHERLANDS, THE

March 12—Dutch citizens vote for a new government, i.e., for the lower house of Parliament, because of the resignation last fall of Socialist Premier Willem Drees and 4 Socialist ministers.

March 14—The largest victor in the parliamentary elections is the Catholic party with 49 seats. The Socialists have 48 seats and the Liberals, 19.

NORWAY

March 11—A vote of no confidence against the Socialist government led by Premier Einar Gerhardsen is rejected by the parliament.

POLAND

March 10—In a speech toeing the party line, Polish Communist party (United Workers) leader Wladyslaw Gomulka opens his party's congress with visitors from Communist parties in 42 countries.

March 11—Soviet and Communist Chinese delegates to the Polish party congress laud Poland's progress towards socialism.

March 19—Gomulka drops 18 old-line Stalinists from the United Workers party's central committee. The closing session of the party congress unanimously approves these changes.

March 31—The repatriation of Poles from the Soviet Union to east Poland, under the agreement of November, 1956, ends. Some 250,000 Poles have been repatriated.

RUMANIA

March 20—It is reported that Rumania's emigration program for Jews stopped March 9.

SPAIN

March 13—The Spanish government announces controls on public and private investment to insure that capital is used where it is most needed and to combat inflation.

SUDAN, THE

March 4—Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abboud, who came to power last November in a bloodless coup, announces the "resignation" of the Supreme Council of the armed forces.

March 5—Abboud appoints a new Supreme Military Council.

March 24—Sir Abdel Rahman, Sudanese religious and political leader who opposed any sort of union with Egypt, dies. He was instrumental in creating the Independent Republic of the Sudan in January, 1956.

TIBET

March 7—The Dalai Lama refuses an invitation to visit Peking, according to reports.

March 20—The people in Lhasa join with Khamba rebel tribesmen and open war against Communist Chinese overlords. Fighting is gravest in Lhasa, where the people are concerned over the whereabouts of the Dalai Lama, a Buddhist spiritual leader.

March 21—India reports that communications with Tibet have been completely extinguished. Tibetan exiles and traders report that the flare-up began some 10 days ago when the Dalai Lama was ordered to appear at Chinese Communist headquarters. Tibetans, fearful of his arrest, asked the Dalai Lama to refuse the summons, which he did.

March 23—Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru states that he does not intend to interfere in Tibet, but expresses concern for the person of the Dalai Lama.

March 25—Reports pieced together reveal that the Tibetan Kashag (cabinet) has renounced the 1951 treaty giving suzerainty to Red China. The Kashag demanded the withdrawal of Chinese troops and proclaimed Tibet's independence.

March 26—Nationalist Chinese leader, President Chiang Kai-shek, urges Tibetans "to carry on the fight."

March 27—Communist China closes the Tibetan-Indian border. It is rumored that the Dalai Lama has fled to southern Tibet, where the Khambas still have control. Some 2000 Tibetan deaths are estimated as a result of the week's fighting.

March 28—Military rule is imposed on Tibet. The Panchen Lama, rival spiritual leader, is designated the nominal chief of state.

March 30—Communist Chinese paratroopers are sent into southern Tibet in an attempt to seek out the Dalai Lama, who is reported heading towards India.

TURKEY (See *British Empire, Cyprus.*)

U.S.S.R., THE (See also *International, Berlin Crisis.*)

March 1—The Soviet Union advises Pakistan against signing the projected military agreement with the U.S.

Elections are held in 9 republics for the Supreme Soviets of the republics and for the local soviets.

Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's strong foreign policy statement refusing to accept a foreign ministers' conference on Berlin during British Prime Minister Macmillan's visit is belittled by the Premier himself as "an electioneering speech."

March 2—The Soviet Union agrees to a foreign ministers' conference, although still preferring summit talks. The Kremlin asks for parity by including Poland and Czechoslovakia at the foreign ministers' meeting.

March 3—Ending unsuccessful talks in Moscow on the Berlin question, British Prime Minister Macmillan and Soviet Premier Khrushchev agree on a British-Soviet trade and cultural exchange. Both leaders support working out an arms agreement to reduce forces and a ban on nuclear weapons.

March 4—Khrushchev arrives in East Germany and promises that a peace treaty will

be signed giving East Germany "full sovereign status" (See also *International, Berlin Crisis*).

March 5—All candidates in the recent elections in 9 republics win.

Russia protests the detention of its fishing trawler by the U.S. The U.S. suspects that the trawler had ruptured a trans-Atlantic Cable.

March 9—Moscow authorizes the formation of voluntary police brigades for maintaining order and good conduct.

March 12—Khrushchev returns from East Germany.

March 15—Soviet organs report that the chief of the Communist party of the Uzbek Republic and his aide have been removed from their posts.

March 16—Khrushchev tells a visiting Iraqi delegation that U.A.R. President Nasser's anti-Communist policy will fail. It is reported that the Soviet Union gave \$150 million to assist Iraqi industry, agriculture and communications. The two nations sign an agreement for long-term economic and technical aid. (See also the *U.A.R.*)

March 17—Communist party changes in the Uzbek Republic extend to its government; the Chairman of the Republic's Council of Ministers is removed from this post.

March 18—Two West German leaders report that Khrushchev told them that "no one," including the Soviet Union, "wants Germany reunified."

March 20—*Tass*, the Soviet official press agency, announces the demotion of Iosif I. Kuzmin, as head of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) and as a deputy premier. Kuzmin, who drafted Khrushchev's seven year plan, is given the rank of minister and made head of the new coordinating body, the scientific economic council.

March 21—The U.S. State Department releases figures showing that during the last year the Communist bloc gave to 18 underdeveloped nations \$1 billion in aid.

March 23—The U.S. informs the Soviet Union that it has good reason to believe the Russian fishing trawler off Newfoundland badly damaged five trans-Atlantic cables and asks that the guilty parties be punished.

March 28—U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld ends a visit to Moscow after talks with Premier Khrushchev.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (See also *Iraq*.)

March 11—U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser accuses Iraq and foreign Communist agents of attempting to create a split within the Arab world, and in particular in the U.A.R., following the anti-Nasser riots in Baghdad.

March 18—Nasser and Lebanese President Fuad Chehab agree to meet.

March 19—Soviet Premier Khrushchev criticizes Nasser's hostility towards Iraq as "hot-headed."

March 20—Nasser condemns Khrushchev's remarks and lashes out against Soviet interference in Arab affairs.

March 25—Nasser and Lebanese President Chehab issue a joint communique following secret talks. Nasser promises to respect Lebanon's integrity in exchange for Lebanese adherence to Arab world solidarity.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

March 12—Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson reveals that during the marketing year that begins April 1 dairy price supports will remain stationary.

Civil Rights

March 6—Federal District Judge Frank M. Johnson dismisses a Justice Department suit against Alabama, ruling that the Federal Government has no authority to sue states accused of violating Negro voting rights.

Foreign Policy

(See also *International, Berlin Crisis*.)

March 4—President Eisenhower terms general mobilization of the non-Communist world "futile" and "disastrous."

March 5—President Eisenhower holds a special meeting of the National Security Council because of the German crisis and schedules a conference with congressional leaders for March 6.

Iran, Turkey and Pakistan sign defense agreements with the U.S., providing that in the event of aggression against any of them the U.S. "will take such appropriate

action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon."

Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen discusses Philippine-American difficulties with Philippine President Carlos Garcia.

March 9—The Senate confirms the appointment of James W. Riddleberger as director of the International Cooperation Administration, which is in charge of foreign aid funds.

March 11—It is revealed by the Department of State that the U.S. Development Loan Fund has made or approved 71 loans amounting to \$631,756,000 in 33 countries between June 30, 1957, and February 28, 1959.

March 12—The White House reveals that President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan will confer at Camp David in the Catocin Mountains in Maryland. (For information about the conference, see *International, Berlin Crisis*.)

March 13—The President asks for \$3.930 billion in military, economic and technical aid under the Mutual Security Program for the fiscal year beginning July 1.

March 17—The President greets Irish President Sean T. O'Kelly in Washington.

March 18—The U.S. and Malaya agree that the Development Loan Fund is to lend Malaya up to \$20 million for road and bridge construction and for developing deepwater port facilities in the North Kland Straits.

March 28—The State Department charges Red China with "barbarous intervention" in Tibet.

Government

March 11—Elwood R. Quesada is confirmed by the Senate as first head of the Federal Aviation Agency.

March 12—The House of Representatives votes 323 to 89 to admit Hawaii as the fiftieth state; Senate approval was voted 76 to 15 yesterday.

March 17—The Chairman of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Warren G. Magnuson, tells Lewis L. Strauss that the committee will ask "many many questions" before recommending that the Senate confirm his appointment as Secretary of Commerce.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower asks

the governors of nine states to discuss unemployment compensation with him.

March 18—President Eisenhower signs the measure providing that the Territory of Hawaii should become the fiftieth state; the citizens of Hawaii must now vote for statehood.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has completed radiation therapy for cancer, the State Department reveals.

President Eisenhower names Ellis O. Briggs as Ambassador to Greece, replacing James W. Riddleberger, now Director of the International Cooperation Administration. He also asks the Senate to confirm Carl W. Strom as Ambassador to Bolivia, succeeding Philip W. Bonsal, now Ambassador to Cuba.

March 25—Final House and Senate approval is given to a measure extending limited federal funds for supplementary payments to the unemployed to July 1 to avoid abrupt termination of emergency benefit payments to 405,000 unemployed.

March 31—President Eisenhower signs the bill extending limited federal funds for supplementary payments for the unemployed.

Labor

March 5—Union sources in Washington reveal plans for a mass unemployment rally in Washington April 8.

March 12—Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell, in letters to officers of the Senate and the House, urges Congress to hold the national wage minimum at \$1 an hour, and to extend coverage to "several million additional workers."

March 14—President of the Steelworkers David J. McDonald and U.S. Steel Corporation executive R. Conrad Cooper reveal that negotiations for a new steel agreement will start May 18, six weeks before contracts expire on June 30.

March 23—New York union stereotypers sign a two-year contract with the Publishers Association of N.Y., providing for a \$7-a-week wage and welfare "package" increase.

March 25—President Eisenhower warns that labor-management disagreements in the steel industry should be worked out "in such a way that the price is not compelled to go up."

March 26—The printers' union breaks off contract negotiations for the third time with ten New York newspapers.

Military

March 2—Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy reveals plans to retire before the end of Eisenhower's term.

March 3—Launched from Cape Canaveral by an Army rocket, Pioneer IV leaves earth's gravity for a trip past the moon into orbit around the sun. The 13.4 pound capsule of instruments radioes back scientific data as it travels.

March 4—Pioneer IV passes the moon at a distance of 37,000 miles.

March 8—Missouri Senator Stuart Symington heads a Senate subcommittee to check up on "wasteful rivalry and duplication" in space programs.

Chiefs of the Air Force, Army, Marines and Navy submit to Congress in writing their reservations about the Administration's budget.

March 10—The Atomic Energy Commission reveals that miniature atomic "devices" were tested successfully last fall.

March 12—The House approves an extension of military conscription for 4 years; the Senate has already passed the measure.

March 13—Dr. Willard F. Libby of the A.E.C. asserts that Russian nuclear testing doubled the amount of radioactive materials in the earth's atmosphere in one month last fall.

After a week of hearing secret testimony from the service chiefs, Senator Lyndon Johnson, head of the Senate's Preparedness Subcommittee, says that American military leaders agree that U.S. military strength is adequate to the Berlin crisis.

March 18—President Eisenhower selects General Lyman L. Lemnitzer to succeed General Maxwell D. Taylor as Army Chief of Staff June 30. General Nathan Twining is renominated as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Thomas D. White is renominated as Air Force Chief and Admiral Arleigh A. Burke is to continue as Chief of Naval Operations.

March 19—*The New York Times* reveals after more than six months of silence that the U.S. conducted secret nuclear tests more than 300 miles above the earth last

September. The tests, known as "Project Argus," are said to have great military and scientific significance. A thin veil of radiation is said to have followed the lines of the earth's magnetic field. Three nuclear explosions in the South Atlantic comprised the Project.

A Massachusetts Institute of Technology research team reports the first known radar contact with Venus.

March 21—Special Atomic Energy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Major General Herbert B. Loper reveals greater concentration of radioactive strontium 90 on the surface of the U.S. than anywhere else in the world.

March 24—The A.E.C. and the National Academy of Sciences reveal plans for new studies of radiation fall-out dangers.

March 25—Eisenhower declares that as far as he knows "there has been no suppression of information on fall-out."

The White House reveals that Project Argus created a man-made radiation belt 4000 miles from the earth in a matter of hours, setting off artificial auroral displays in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres.

March 26—A Government advisory committee says that the A.E.C. should not have "ultimate authority" in protecting the public from radiation hazard; this function should immediately be shifted to the Public Health Service.

March 27—The Navy reveals that the nuclear submarine Skate has made a second North Pole trip.

March 28—Official figures reveal that in 5 years there have been 5000 fatal accidents in military aircraft.

March 30—A censored transcript of secret hearings of the defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee reveals that Army Staff Chief General Maxwell Taylor and Naval Chief Admiral Arleigh Burke believe the U.S. is over-supplied with nuclear weapons that could destroy the U.S.S.R. "several times over."

Politics

March 4—Democratic National Chairman Paul M. Butler predicts that Adlai Stevenson will not be the Democratic presidential candidate in 1960.

Harold E. Stassen accepts an offer to run for mayor of Philadelphia on the Republican ticket.

March 5—Adlai Stevenson agrees with Paul Butler that he will not be a presidential candidate in 1960 "under any circumstances."

March 23—A federal grand jury investigating the Little Rock, Arkansas, Fifth Congressional District election adjourns until March 31.

Supreme Court

March 2—The Court rules that extradition arrangements made by 42 states and Puerto Rico for obtaining witnesses in criminal proceedings are not in violation of the Constitution.

March 23—The Court rules unanimously that state officials must allow Federal claims against state employee's wages for unpaid taxes.

March 30—Dealing with two different cases, the Supreme Court rules 6 to 3 that "two sovereignties"—the federal government and a state government—can bring successive prosecutions against a man for the same offense despite the constitutional bar to the federal government against "double jeopardy."

URUGUAY

March 1—The defeated Colorado party, after 93 years in office without interruption, hands over the governmental powers to the Nationalist party, which won its first election victory in November, 1958.

YEMEN

March 23—It is announced that Hungary and Yemen will establish diplomatic relations.

YUGOSLAVIA

March 6—President Tito returns from a 3-month Afro-Asian tour and lashes out against Communist bloc criticisms of Yugoslavia.

March 14—Yugoslavia's Ambassador to Albania is formally recalled because of Albanian attacks on Yugoslavia.

March 31—The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia agree to a cultural cooperation pact for 1959.

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